Stories Told and Untold: Confidentiality Laws and the Master Narrative of Child Welfare by Fraidin, Matthew I.
Maine Law Review 
Volume 63 Number 1 Article 2 
January 2010 
Stories Told and Untold: Confidentiality Laws and the Master 
Narrative of Child Welfare 
Matthew I. Fraidin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Family Law Commons, and the Juvenile Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Matthew I. Fraidin, Stories Told and Untold: Confidentiality Laws and the Master Narrative of Child 
Welfare, 63 Me. L. Rev. 1 (2010). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.mainelaw.maine.edu/mlr/vol63/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Maine School of Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Maine Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Maine 
School of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact mdecrow@maine.edu. 
 
 
STORIES TOLD AND UNTOLD: CONFIDENTIALITY 
LAWS AND THE MASTER NARRATIVE OF CHILD 
WELFARE 
Matthew I. Fraidin 
I. INTRODUCTION 
II. STORIES OF CHILD WELFARE 
 A. The Master Narrative, Stories, and Agenda-Setting 
 B. The Master Narrative of Child Welfare: Deviance, Monsters, and 
Abuse 
  1. History and Research 
  2. Framing and the Master Narrative of Child Welfare: An 
Example 
 C. Another Story of Child Welfare 
  1. Foster Care is Populated by Children from Low-Income 
Families Who Experience Neglect, Not Abuse 
  2. Many Children Suffer Greater Harm in Foster Care Than at 
Home 
III. CONFIDENTIALITY LAWS 
 A. The Law 
 B. The Law-in-Action: Silencing Youth and Suppressing Stories 
  1. Shawntaye Debrew: The Court Clamps Down 
  2. “Paul Getty”: “He Doesn’t Want to Talk to You”  
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF CONFIDENTIALITY LAWS 
 A. Many Children are Placed in Foster Care Unnecessarily 
 B. Placements with Relatives are Discouraged 
 C. Lawyers, Social Workers, and Judges Ignore, Reject, and Silence 
Parents 
 D. Black Children are Over-Represented in Foster Care and Receive 
Worse Treatment in Foster Care than White Children 
 E. Throwaway People 
  1. Throwaway Agencies 
  2. Throwaway Children 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 A. Reframing the Debate 
 B. Untold Stories 
2 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:1 
STORIES TOLD AND UNTOLD: CONFIDENTIALITY 
LAWS AND THE MASTER NARRATIVE OF CHILD 
WELFARE 
Matthew I. Fraidin* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In most states, child welfare hearings and records are sealed or confidential.  
This means that by law, court hearings and records may not be observed.  The same 
laws and court rules also preclude those who are authorized to enter and watch 
from discussing anything learned or observed in a closed courtroom or from a 
sealed court record with anyone not involved in the case.  It is the restriction on 
speech—on telling stories about child welfare—with which this Article is 
concerned.  I will argue in this Article that the insights of narrative theory and 
agenda-setting studies help us understand the damaging consequences of 
confidentiality laws.   
Child welfare is characterized by a single, “master narrative,” or overarching 
description of conditions and phenomena that explains, or purports to explain, the 
field.1  The master narrative gathers the stories of child welfare and unifies them 
into a single, coherent, commonly-accepted image.  It is the way child welfare 
issues are understood.  In short, the master narrative of child welfare depicts foster 
care as a haven for “child-victims”2 savagely brutalized by “deviant,”3 
                                                                                                     
 * Associate Professor of Law, University of the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of 
Law (UDC-DCSL); Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center (GULC), 
2010-11.  B.A., Haverford College, 1987; J.D. University of Wisconsin, 1993.  The idea for this Article 
emerged from the insights of Ruth Ann White and Richard Wexler.  Thanks to Jane Aiken, Martin 
Guggenheim, Norine Johnson, Dorothy Roberts, Richard Wexler, and Dari Yudkoff, who commented 
on drafts of this paper, and to Tashira Halyard, Elise Kessler, Meredith Kinner, Benjamin Martie, Rita 
Mutyaba, Yelena Rodriguez, and Travis Van Hook for excellent research assistance.  Thanks to 
Professor William McLain for good advice, kindly offered.  Most special thanks to Margaret Johnson, 
for all of that and everything else, and to Max and Maya Johnson-Fraidin for their support.  Thank you 
to UDC-DCSL and GULC for generous support of this project.  Thanks, finally, to Anthony 
Amsterdam, et al., authors of the excellent Stories Told and Untold: Lawyering Theory Analyses of the 
First Rodney King Assault Trial, 12 CLINICAL L. REV.  1 (2005), for their generous permission to echo 
in this work a portion of the title of that article. 
Editor’s Note: Many of the stories detailed in this Article are drawn from Professor Fraidin’s 
personal experiences and observations in the District of Columbia.  Accordingly, in some instances the 
names of minors in these stories are pseudonyms and factual assertions related to these stories are 
attributable to those experiences and observations. 
 1. See JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE 18-
37 (1979) (arguing that postmodernism is characterized by “incredulity towards metanarratives”).  
 2. See JOEL BEST, THREATENED CHILDREN: RHETORIC AND CONCERN ABOUT CHILD-VICTIMS 4-6 
(1993) (explaining that the image of children as victims has played “an important role in the history of 
American child saving”).  
 3. See generally Nina Bernstein, Press Coverage and Public Perception: In Child Welfare 
Reporting, Even Good Daily Coverage Can be Distorting, NIEMAN REPORTS, Winter 2000; BARBARA J. 
NELSON, MAKING AN ISSUE OF CHILD ABUSE: POLITICAL AGENDA SETTING FOR SOCIAL PROBLEMS 73 
(1984). 
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“monstrous”4 parents.  Notwithstanding this shared public understanding, however, 
most children in foster care are alleged to have experienced neglect—deprivation 
of food, clothing, shelter, education, or another necessity of life—not physical 
abuse.  There is also a growing understanding that some children in foster care 
ought not to be there at all.  In addition, research and experience indicate that many 
maltreated children would be better off if simply left at home—with those 
responsible for the maltreatment—rather than placed in foster care.5 
The press and public have a limited view of maltreated children, their parents, 
and the family court system.  I will argue that confidentiality laws perpetuate and 
strengthen this view, and preclude other narratives from competing for 
preeminence and from informing or influencing the master narrative.  Stated 
simply, laws prohibiting the discussion of child welfare cases silence a vast number 
of stories.  By their terms, these laws define the stories that may not be told, and the 
putative storytellers who may not speak, while designating as acceptable other 
stories and other voices.  The unchallenged dominance of the law-sanctioned 
narrative affects even those involved in child welfare as a profession, and by 
affecting their worldview, diminishes the quality of care provided to children.  The 
laws that require silence outside the courtroom permit the acceptance of pervasive 
dysfunction in child welfare, and affect the administration of justice inside the 
courtroom. 
In Part II of this Article, I explain the concept of the master narrative, and 
present research about agenda-setting and issue-framing.  I then present contrasting 
stories of child welfare, the “master narrative,” and an alternative story.  The 
former reflects widespread popular conceptions of children, parents, the foster care 
system, and the executive and judicial branches of government; the alternative 
story is told by weaving the stories of individual children and parents with data and 
findings by child welfare researchers.  
In Part III, I set forth current laws and court rules that regulate admission to 
and disclosure of child welfare court hearings and records.  In this Part, I share 
stories of two foster youths who sought to tell their own stories, but were 
confronted with attempts to silence them. 
In Part IV, I argue that confidentiality laws perpetuate the disjunction between 
the widely-accepted master narrative of child welfare and the alternative story of 
child welfare.  I argue that confidentiality laws harm children and their parents by 
silencing their voices and suppressing their stories.   
II.  STORIES OF CHILD WELFARE 
A.  The Master Narrative, Stories, and Agenda-Setting 
A master narrative says it all, or thinks it does.  Identified by Jean-Francois 
Lyotard, who defined the post-modern era by its “incredulity toward 
                                                                                                     
 4. AXEL AUBRUN & JOSEPH GRADY, HOW THE NEWS FRAMES CHILD MALTREATMENT: 
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 3 (2003). 
 5. See Joseph J. Doyle, Jr., Child Protection and Child Outcomes, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1583, 1584 
(2007). 
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metanarratives,”6 “master,” “grand,” or meta-narratives have been described 
variously as “general accounts of human nature and history that purport to be 
independent of time, place, culture, and other contextual influences, and that 
determine how knowledge and truth are constituted,”7 and “fictions that privilege 
specialized ways of thinking, particularized ways of feeling and normalized ways 
of being, establishing nothing more than an artificially imposed order.”8  The 
master narrative presumes itself as “able to organize vice and virtue, hubris and 
comeuppance, crisis and imperative response, across a variety of particulars.”9  
Grand narratives are, of course, composed of smaller ones—stories.  But such 
narratives also spawn stories, which in turn strengthen and recreate the narrative 
from which they were spawned.  Far more than being merely descriptive, the act of 
storytelling is creative, in that we create the world around us as we name it.  “We 
participate in creating what we see in the very act of describing it.”10  As we will 
see, the distinctive grand narrative of child welfare grows itself every time one of 
its component stories is told. 
Stories about social issues, like child abuse, are often told in popular media.  
Social problems become social movements when they are recognized and given 
attention.11  This happens through stories retold by the media.12  As the media hear 
stories and choose from among those which to retell, they seek stories that are 
dramatic, memorable, contain an element of irony or unexpectedness, and are 
relatively easy to investigate and report.  “The qualities of immediacy and drama 
required of news stories inevitably slant the selection of stories toward the more 
sensational.”13  A story that permits the media to feel good about its role improves 
its chances of being noticed and retold.   
Media storytelling can set the agenda of public policy.  Agenda-setting theory 
describes the role of the media in establishing policy priorities and influencing 
public perceptions and debate.  Pioneered by Maxwell McCombs, agenda-setting 
theory and scholarly progeny, such as issue-framing studies, reveal the enormous 
power of the media to create an agenda for politicians and the public.  Agenda-
setting refers to the topics or subjects of news media coverage and the effect of the 
coverage of those issues on the prioritization of those issues in the minds of those 
                                                                                                     
 6. LYOTARD, supra note 1, at xxiv. 
 7. Frederick Mark Gedicks, God of Our Fathers, Gods for Ourselves: Fundamentalism and 
Postmodern Belief, 18 WM. MARY BILL RTS. J.  901, 904 (2010) (quoting Frederick Mark Gedicks, 
Spirituality, Fundamentalism, Liberty, Religion at the End of Modernity, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1197, 
1198-99 (2005)). 
 8. Bruce A. Arrigo, Identity, International Terrorism and Negotiating Peace:  Hamas and Ethics-
Based Considerations from Critical Restorative Justice, 50 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 772, 776 (2010) 
(citation omitted). 
 9. Jedediah Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Climate Change, Environmental Law, and Democracy, 
119 YALE L.J. 1122, 1177 (2010). 
 10. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 2411, 2416 (1988); Jeffrey Hubbard et. al., Mass Media Influences on Public Conceptions of 
Social Problems, 23 SOC. PROBS. 22, 22 (1975) (“[S]ocial problems are what people say and think they 
are.  There are no particular conditions of society that are inherently problematic.”). 
 11. BEST, supra note 2, at 11. 
 12. Id. at 14 (“Media coverage attracts public attention to the cause.”). 
 13. Patrick Ayre, Child Protection and the Media: Lessons from the Last Three Decades, 31 BRIT. 
J. SOC. WORK 887, 889 (2001). 
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influenced.   
In modern society, popular media are the vehicle by which master narratives 
become the public agenda.  In the area of civil rights, for example, repeated 
coverage over an extended period of time caused many Americans to keep the issue 
in the forefront of their minds and to believe it should be addressed and resolved.14  
Similar dynamics have been observed with respect to numerous issues, including 
foreign relations, political campaign issues, and the environment. 
Agenda-setting effects may be especially pronounced on individuals with a 
high level of “news awareness,” such as people who have at least some college-
level education.  Those with high levels of education, such as lawyers, judges, and 
social workers involved in child welfare, may be more susceptible to agenda-
setting effects because they have a high capacity to take in and process 
information.15  Thus, as I will argue, absorption of the master narrative is 
particularly pronounced, and especially consequential, among those most 
intimately involved in child welfare cases. 
First-level agenda-setting research examines the extent to which the media’s 
coverage of an event, person, or issue affects the public’s prioritization of that 
issue.16  It is primarily a quantitative analysis, comparing the number and frequency 
of media reports with the public’s perception of the importance of the issue.   The 
phenomenon of agenda-setting was first studied with respect to issues in political 
campaigns.17  Since then, research has demonstrated that a wide range of issues are 
responsive to agenda-setting effects.18   
Second-level agenda-setting analysis has gained prominence more recently.  A 
more qualitative analysis, this concept merges with studies of issue-framing effects, 
measuring the consequences of media coverage of particular attributes of an event, 
person, or issue.19  “The second [level] is making some aspects of the matter and 
criteria for its evaluation more salient than others.”20  In terms reminiscent of 
                                                                                                     
 14. See John M. Johnson, Horror Stories and the Construction of Child Abuse, in IMAGES OF 
ISSUES: TYPIFYING CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS 5 (Joel Best ed., 1989). 
 15. David B. Hill, Viewer Characteristics and Agenda Setting by Television News, 49 PUB. OP. Q. 
340, 343 (1986). 
 16. See Maxwell E. McCombs, A Look at Agenda-Setting Research: Past, Present, and Future, 6 
JOURNALISM STUD. 543 (2005).  
 17. See Maxwell E. McCombs & Donald L. Shaw, The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media, 36 
PUB. OP. Q. 176, 176 (1972). 
 18. See McCombs, supra note 16, at 543 (agenda-setting effects have been the subject of “hundreds 
of studies worldwide” since 1972); Wayne Wanta & Salma Ghanem, Effects of Agenda Setting, in MASS 
MEDIA EFFECTS RESEARCH: ADVANCES THROUGH META-ANALYSIS 37 (Raymond W. Preiss et al., eds., 
2007) (“The vast majority of [agenda-setting] studies have found widespread support for a media 
influence on issue salience.  In other words, the amount of press coverage that issues receive gives 
individuals salience cues with which they learn the relative importance of these issues.”). 
 19. See Robert M. Entman, Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm, J. COMM., 
Autumn 1993, at 51, 52 (“To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more 
salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.”).   
 20. Robert M. Entman, Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and Our Understanding of the 
Social World at 121 (book review) (“Thus, while first-level agenda-setting suggests media coverage 
influences what we think about, second-level agenda-setting suggests media coverage influences how 
we think, or frame, the issues we are thinking about.”).  See also Stephanie Craft & Wayne Wanta, U.S. 
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Lyotard’s conception of a meta-narrative, W.A. Gamson described an issue-frame 
as “a central organizing idea for making sense of relevant events and suggesting 
what is at issue.”21  The frame of a story determines the “prominent themes or 
meanings within or perceived from a news story as a whole.”22 
Framing is choosing themes of a story, distinguishing between major and 
insignificant characters, emphasizing some plot twists and hushing others.  The 
outcomes of these choices comprise a story that has more than a simple impact: it 
creates the world as it is imagined and recounted.23  Thus, journalists decide which 
issues to cover and how to present them; considerations include which sources to 
use and the relative prominence of different concerned parties’ interests.24  These 
choices define the frame of the story; they determine what the story is about and 
how it is told.  Issue-framing research has confirmed that the way stories are told 
makes a difference: “[F]rames can affect the way in which the public perceives the 
issues that are covered.”25  Thus, in a study of the coverage of the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001, “[t]he two attributes . . . that news media users expressed 
the most concern about were those attributes that received extensive news 
coverage.”26 
Research has identified common elements of frames of news stories.  
Sensationalism, provocative and descriptive language, violence, arresting imagery, 
and drama all are perceived to make for “good ‘copy,’”27 and thus are the 
hallmarks of a considerable amount of journalism.28  For example, Blood, Putnis, 
and Pirkis found that 29 percent of Australian media stories about mental illness 
were “unnecessarily dramatic or contain[ed] sensational language.”29  As 
demonstrated below, most child welfare reporting reflects these qualities. 
Accordingly, news reports contain a comparative paucity of contextualizing 
information, such as data or reference to patterns, themes, or trends.  For example, 
a 1998 study found that only one-third of crime coverage included contextual 
information about the incident.30  In a study of major newspapers’ coverage of 
children’s issues, more than 95 percent of stories about violence by and against 
children focused on a discrete incident, and ignored larger public policy 
                                                                                                     
Public Concerns in the Aftermath of 9-11: A Test of Second Level Agenda-Setting, INT’L J. PUB. OP. 
RES., Winter 2004, at 456. 
 21. W.A. Gamson, News as Framing: Comments on Graber, AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST, Nov.-Dec. 
1989, at 157, 157. 
 22. Lori Dorfman, Esther Thorson & Jane Ellen Stevens, Reporting on Violence: Bringing a Public 
Health Perspective into the Newsroom, 28 HEALTH EDUC. BEHAV. 402, 405 (2001).    
 23. Delgado, supra note 10, at 2412-15. 
 24. See, e.g., W.A. Gamson & Andre Modigliani, Media Discourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear 
Power: A Constructionist Approach, AM. J. SOC., July 1989, at 1, 1-37.  
 25. Craft & Wanta, supra note 20, at 457. 
 26. Id. at 460. 
 27. Johnson, supra note 14, at 13. 
 28. Claudette Artwick & Margaret Gordon, Portrayal of U.S. Cities by Daily Newspapers, 
NEWSPAPER RES. J., Winter 1998, at 54, 55. 
 29. Sara Tiegreen & Elana Newman, How News is “Framed”, DART CENTER FOR JOURNALISM & 
TRAUMA (Mar. 31, 2008), http://dartcenter.org/content/how-news-is-framed (last visited Nov. 16, 2010) 
(citation omitted). 
 30. Artwick & Gordon, supra note 28, at 54.   
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questions.31 
With respect to contextualizing information, too, the choice to include it or not 
has an impact on readers.  The inclusion of contextualizing information—even in 
reports of individual incidents—creates in readers a greater sense of optimism, a 
belief in the efficacy of prevention, and a stronger sense of a societal role in 
individual incidents, than do traditional, purely episodic reports.32  The media’s 
choices of frames may have the greatest significance with respect to issues about 
which members of the public have limited firsthand knowledge or experience—
issues for which individuals themselves cannot provide a frame.33  As described 
below, the issue of child abuse appears to have a distinct frame.  Media reports 
about the issue reflect a meta-narrative, a unifying theme that purports to express a 
shared understanding, or as Hans Bertens describes: “[T]he supposedly 
transcendent and universal truths that serve to justify and legitimate Western 
culture.”34 
The media’s coverage can create that narrative, and subsequently reinforce it.  
A meta-narrative shares commonalities with what Barbara J. Nelson has called 
“valence issues,” namely issues on which there is little to no public disagreement.35  
As we will see, child abuse is a valence issue; no one supports it.36  But we will 
also see that it is the definition of an issue that makes it unarguable, just as the 
telling of a story creates the reality that supports the story’s coherence and 
believability, and just as the meta-narrative purports to synthesize and explain an 
issue.37  The valence quality of child abuse and neglect as portrayed in the media 
suggests that first- and second-level agenda-setting merge with respect to valence 
issues: merely by placing the issue on the radar screen, the media not only identify 
that the issue exists, but also explain its meaning and significance. 
Valence issues and meta-narratives drown out other versions of events that 
                                                                                                     
 31. See generally DALE KUNKEL ET. AL., COVERAGE IN CONTEXT: HOW THOROUGHLY THE NEWS 
MEDIA REPORT FIVE KEY CHILDREN’S ISSUES. 
 32. For example, Coleman and Thorson reported that college students who read stories written in a 
public health frame believed that society has a greater role in crime and violence problems than did 
readers of stories that lacked contextual information.  See Sara Tiegreen & Elana Newman, The Effect of 
News “Frames”, DART CENTER FOR JOURNALISM & TRAUMA (Jan. 1, 2008), http://dartcenter.org/ 
content/effect-news-frames (last visited Nov. 16, 2010) (citations omitted).  The research subjects also 
did not find contextualized stories to be engaging.  Id.  
 33. See Craft & Wanta, supra note 20, at 461 (“Information about unobtrusive issues . . . comes 
largely from media, making media a more powerful influence on judgments of importance.”).  
 34. POSTMODERNISM: THE KEY FIGURES 246 (Hans Bertens and Joseph Natoli eds., 2002).  See 
also Jay Rosen, PressThink Basics: The Master Narrative in Journalism, PRESSTHINK (Sept. 8, 2003), 
http://archive.pressthink.org/2003/09/08/basics_master.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2010). 
 35. NELSON, supra note 3, at 27 (“A valence issue such as child abuse elicits a single, strong, fairly 
uniform emotional response and does not have an adversarial quality.”). 
 36. Id. at 28.  Nelson explains:  
To the extent that a policy issue involves only one widely held ideal (or several 
complementary ideals) it will be a valence issue . . . . Thus, when we speak of a valence 
policy issue, both the problem and its preferred or intended solutions must invoke a more 
or less uniform, single-position affirmation of a civic ideal. 
Id.  See also BEST, supra note 2, at 183 (“No one defended harming children . . . . [O]verall, campaigns 
against threats to children faced little overt opposition.”). 
 37. According to Barbara Nelson, “Antony Downs has argued forcefully that the media portray 
problems in ways which gloss over fundamental conflicts of value.”  NELSON, supra note 3, at 25. 
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would complicate the understanding of an issue.  These powerful vehicles for 
setting agendas and framing issues create and then perpetuate a one-dimensional 
world, which often fails to take account of the experiences of the powerless, of 
outsiders, of those oppressed by the status quo. 
These dynamics have played out in dramatic fashion in the field of child 
welfare.  Child abuse was depicted in dramatic, media-friendly terms, and thus 
received sufficient attention that it became a social movement.38  The movement 
has sustained its strength, fueled by stories which together have created a master 
narrative.   
B.  The Master Narrative of Child Welfare: Deviance, Monsters, and Abuse 
The term “child abuse” brings to mind extreme physical harm.  This image is 
likely drawn from the extensive media coverage of child abuse, coverage that does 
little to advance an informed public policy dialogue about the issue.39 
1.  History and Research 
Child welfare is a fertile proving ground for theories of storytelling, meta-
narrative, and the issue-framing tendencies of the media.  There is widespread 
agreement that there is a master narrative of child welfare, and on the contents of 
that narrative.  The narrative is sensational, episodic, devoid of contextualizing 
information,40 and reliant on official governmental sources.  
According to media portrayals and popular understanding, child abuse is brutal 
violence; children are innocent victims; parents are deviant and monstrous; and 
children must be separated from parents for their protection.41  The narrative 
dovetails with pernicious, longstanding stereotypes of people of color, especially 
African-Americans.42  The narrative contains subplots about the government and 
social workers: case workers are depicted as overwhelmed, incompetent 
bureaucrats who sometimes are uncaring, but more often simply ill-equipped and 
bumbling.  Strands of the narrative about children, their parents, governmental 
actors, and the nature of abuse interweave and complement each other, and together 
heighten the polarizing effects of the overall narrative.  The coherence and 
interconnectedness of the several strands of the narrative is evolutionary, as it 
ensures the continued vitality of the tried-and-true storyline. 
The narrative of child abuse began its contemporary ascent to prominence in 
1962 with the publication in the Journal of the American Medical Association of 
                                                                                                     
 38. Id. at 126 (“[A] social problem is a social construct.  A social problem depends not only on the 
existence of conditions unacceptable to some people, but also on organization to redress those 
conditions and a modicum of social support for such efforts.”). 
 39. MEG BOSTROM, DISCIPLINE AND DEVELOPMENT: A META-ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS 
OF PARENTS, PARENTING, CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND CHILD ABUSE, PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE LLC 18 
(2003). 
 40. See KUNKEL ET. AL., supra note 31, at 7 (5 percent of stories about child abuse and neglect 
include contextualizing information; 17 percent of child abuse and neglect stories include information 
about policy issues). 
 41. See Ruth White, Snorkeling in the Muck: Moving Beyond the Child Welfare Grand Narrative 
with Professor Fraidin (2009) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
 42. See infra Part IV. 
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The Battered-Child Syndrome,43 by Dr. Henry Kempe.  According to Kempe, his 
research suggested that some children suffered severe abuse and injury at the hands 
of their caretakers.  “The battered child syndrome,” he wrote, “is a term used . . . to 
characterize a clinical condition in young children who have received serious 
physical abuse, usually from a parent or foster parent.”44  Kempe’s article 
mentioned such “parental assault[s]”45 as “direct murder,”46 “severe slapping or 
spanking,”47 and “child beating,”48 and included case studies of an infant with 
“subdural hematomas” and a “fractured femur,”49 and another with a “fractured 
skull.”50  The two children whose case studies were synopsized in the article were 
three-months-old51 and thirteen-months-old.52  The article also reprinted x-ray films 
of a five-month-old boy53 and seven-and-a-half-month-old girl.54  Use of these 
stories and images was consistent with Kempe’s finding that “in general, the 
affected children are younger than 3 years.”55 
Kempe’s description of “child abusers” foreshadowed contemporary images of 
parents whose children are in the foster care system: “A frank psychosis is usually 
readily apparent;”56 “extremely sociopathic;”57 “of low intelligence . . . 
psychopathic or sociopathic characters.  Alcoholism, sexual promiscuity, unstable 
marriages, and minor criminal activity are reportedly common among them.  They 
are immature, impulsive, self-centered, hypersensitive, and quick to react with 
poorly controlled aggression.”58 
Kempe’s study was publicized widely.59  Nelson argues that Kempe’s findings 
were distorted by selective, sensational oversimplification.  She observes that 
“magazines and newspapers initially showed a preference for reporting cases of 
bizarre brutalization, giving journalists the opportunity to act as the child’s 
advocate against the crime of parenting gone crazy.”60  Joel Best concurs: “[E]arly 
reports in both the medical literature and the press portrayed the problem as one of 
extreme physical violence against very young children.”61 
                                                                                                     
 43. C. Henry Kempe et. al., The Battered-Child  Syndrome, J. AM. MED. ASS’N, July 7, 1962, at 17, 
reprinted in CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 143 (1985).  See NELSON, supra note 3, at 56; BEST, supra 
note 3, at 66. 
 44. Kempe et. al., supra note 43, at 143. 
 45. Id. at 144. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 145. 
 48. Id. at 146. 
 49. Id. at 146. 
 50. Kempe et. al., supra note 43, at 147. 
 51. Id. at 146. 
 52. Id. at 147. 
 53. Id. at 148, 150. 
 54. Id. at 149, 151. 
 55. Id. at 144. 
 56. Kempe et al., supra note 43, at 144. 
 57. Id. at 145. 
 58. Id. 
 59. NELSON, supra note 3, at 58-56. 
 60. Id. at 51. 
 61. BEST, supra note 2, at 67 (citing, as an example, a 1976 television news program, which “began 
with nine slides of bruised infants and toddlers lying in hospital beds wearing only diapers and 
bandages, while the correspondent spoke: ‘What you are seeing now are the actual results of severe 
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Child abuse victims came to be understood as recipients of the most brutal of 
attacks, acts which, as Best said, have no defenders.62  Nelson describes violent 
child abuse as a valence issue, meaning that there is no controversy and no debate.  
“A valence issue such as child abuse elicits a single, strong, fairly uniform 
emotional response and does not have an adversarial quality . . . . By far the most 
important attribute of the child abuse issue is its valence quality.”63  There are not 
two sides to the issue of child abuse, as it was depicted, for who would argue that 
the state overreaches by removing from the home of a “monster” a child who has 
suffered grievous harms? 
The valence quality of child abuse made it a useful vehicle for lawmakers and 
activists who sought recognition of the issue as a social problem requiring 
attention.64  The legal definition and popular understanding of child abuse 
expanded to include an ever-increasing range of errors, misdeeds, and purported 
sins of commission and omission.  Best argues that “it became possible to label 
almost anything that might harm children as child abuse,”65 observing that the label 
was used for such varied phenomena as abortion policy, smoking by pregnant 
women, explicit rock lyrics, circumcision, inadequate social services, religious 
fervor, and parental kidnapping.66 
Notwithstanding the application of the term child abuse to widely-varied 
circumstances, child abuse continues to be depicted by sensational, episodic stories 
of severe brutality.67  The vast majority of child welfare news stories depict 
children who have been victimized by such acts as:  
[B]eating . . . [or] burning—with matches, cigarettes or electric irons, or by 
holding the child’s hands, arms or feet over an open flame . . . .  Others are 
strangled, thrown, dropped, shot, stabbed, shaken, drowned, suffocated, sexually 
violated, held under running water, tied upright for long periods of time, stepped 
                                                                                                     
child abuse.’”).  See also NELSON, supra note 3, at 136 (child abuse typified by “instances of extremely 
brutal physical abuse”). 
 62. See BEST, supra note 2, at 183-86. 
 63. NELSON, supra note 3, at 27.  See id. at 4 (“[C]hild abuse was vigorously portrayed as a 
noncontroversial issue.  Disagreements about how best to respond to abuse were suppressed . . . .”). 
 64. See BEST, supra  note 2, at 11 (“[S]ocial problems are socially constructed; people make claims 
arguing that particular conditions are social problems, and others respond to those claims.  It is this 
process of claims-making that turns conditions—which previously may have gone unnoticed or been 
taken for granted—into objects of concern—social problems.”). 
 65. Id. at 77. 
 66. Id. at 74-77. 
 67. According to an analysis by Martin and Glantz in 1997, “the phrase ‘child abuse and neglect’ 
seems to almost always bring up images of the most extreme and high profile cases which quickly 
moves the discussion to the problem of dealing with the most severe cases.”  BOSTROM, supra note 39, 
at 18.  Bostrom’s report explains: 
It should be no surprise that people have this reaction to “child abuse” since a great deal 
of the news coverage about children consists of abuse and neglect stories. A media 
content analysis by the Casey Journalism Center found that news about children 
overwhelmingly consists of stories about violence done to children or by children. 
Id. 
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on, bitten, given electric shocks, forced to swallow pepper or buried alive.68  
John M. Johnson studied all child abuse and neglect-related news stories 
published in Arizona’s two major newspapers from 1948 to 1980.69  In all, the 
newspapers published a total of 623 stories.70  From 1948 to 1969, some 95 percent 
described “an individual case of childhood injury.  Most of these were dramatic, 
horrific stories.”71  From 1948 to 1980, 70 percent were “horror stories.”72  
According to Johnson, horror stories often contain elements of “ironic contrast” 
and “structural incongruity,”73 which are “bizarre, strange, unusual, or ‘out of 
place’”74 and heighten a reader’s emotional response to already-compelling facts.75 
Johnson’s descriptive phrase—horror stories—requires little elaboration.  He is 
referring to stories about “horrible injuries or gruesome circumstances,”76 such as 
the terrible discovery of a nine-year-old girl:  “The Baltimore Police found Patty 
Saunders, 9, in the 23 x 52 inch closet where she had been locked for half her life.  
She weighed only 20 pounds, and stood less than three feet tall.  Smeared with 
filth, scarred from parental beatings, Patty had become irreparably mentally 
retarded.”77  A South Carolina girl with a “ruptured liver and spleen and eye 
injuries, a fractured knee, 14 broken ribs, bite marks on her cheeks, bruises on her 
stomach and back and alcohol in her bloodstream.”78  The nude body of a two-
month-old Indiana boy, “found under some dirt, leaves, and cement in the 
foundation of a torn down house . . . .”79 
Johnson’s conclusions about media coverage of child abuse and neglect issues 
are supported by 2003 research by psychological anthropologist Axel Aubrun and 
linguist Joseph Grady on behalf of advocacy group Prevent Child Abuse America 
(PCAA).80  Aubrun and Grady analyzed approximately 120 news articles and 
“several dozen” television news reports about child maltreatment.81  Like Johnson, 
the researchers find that stories about child abuse and neglect ordinarily 
“emphasi[ze] . . . sensational events and images,” depicting “episodic” incidents of 
brutal abuse, rather than broader themes or trends relating to children, poverty, 
                                                                                                     
 68. NELSON, supra note 3, at 60-61 (citation omitted).  “One obvious motivation for emphasizing 
the most unusual and extreme forms of abuse is that newspapers can then titillate their readers with 
stories that are unwholesome as well as violent.”  Id. at 66. 
 69. Johnson, supra note 14, at 7. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See id. 
 73. Id. at 9-10. 
 74. Id. at 10. 
 75. See Johnson, supra note 14, at 10.  See also AUBRUN & GRADY, supra note 4, at 4 (providing an 
example of a story with a compelling, provocative “twist,” namely that “the abuser seemed harmless, or 
even much better than harmless”) (citing Shaken Baby Deaths Defy Easy Answers, CHI. TRIBUNE, Mar. 
5, 2001 (“One friend recalled seeing [the accused abuser] around her baby, and recalled a gentle man 
who took to children easily. ‘A lot of us thought, ‘Boy, his wife is really getting a great guy.’”)). 
 76. Johnson, supra note 14, at 8. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. at 9. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See generally, AUBRUN & GRADY, supra note 4.  
 81. Id. at 1. 
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abuse or neglect.82  The report also indicates that many news reports are “simple, 
causal stories [that] reinforce unproductive associations with the topic—e.g., a 
parent gets violent with his child because the parent is a sick, drunken monster.”83  
Consistent with the general findings reported above, the report finds that media 
coverage rarely, if ever, contextualizes reports of incidents by describing the 
family’s financial, medical, or social circumstances.84  
According to Aubrun and Grady, the most common frame of stories about 
child maltreatment is that of a “horrible, criminal atrocity some monstrous parent 
has committed, and the horrible suffering of the child(ren) in question.”85  The 
report offers examples such as a parent’s “systematic torture” of her child,86 and a 
mother who “gave birth in a factory bathroom, then put the baby in a trash bin and 
went back to her job packaging chocolate.”87  Aubrun and Grady suggest that 
sensational stories are prevalent because they: 
[A]re easy to tell (and to gather information for), and they fit the mold of simple, 
sensational and episodic: they are about a terrible thing that one person does to 
another. They are especially sensational because of shared taboos against harming 
children, and shared cultural models of ‘monsters’ whose actions can’t be chalked 
up to any rational causes.”88 
The report also notes that in addition to describing incidents of brutal violence, 
news stories sometimes address governmental malfunction.89  Even in this second 
category of stories, most of the examples are of stories of incidents in which 
government case workers failed to take from a family a child who ultimately was 
injured or killed.90  Thus, even stories perceived to be about a system actor, rather 
                                                                                                     
 82. Id. at 2.  See also KUNKEL ET. AL., supra note 31, at 7 (“[A]bout 9 out of 10 . . . stories [about 
child abuse and neglect, and youth crime and violence] reflect an episodic frame.”); NELSON, supra note 
3, at 72 (commenting on “newspapers’ tradition of reporting child abuse as crimes of bizarre 
brutalization”). 
 83. AUBRUN & GRADY, supra note 4, at 2. 
 84. See also KUNKEL ET. AL., supra note 31, at 11 (commenting on “the dramatically low rate at 
which stories about youth crime/violence or child abuse/neglect provide any important contextual 
information in their coverage.  Fewer than 1 of every 20 stories . . . includes any information to help the 
reader relate the ‘breaking news’ developments to broader patterns and trends.”).  Dorfman, Thorson, 
and Stevens define contextualizing information as information relating to the “interactions among the 
victim, agent of injury or death, and the environment.”  Tiegreen & Newman, The Effect of News 
“Frames”, supra note 32.  Notwithstanding the beneficial impacts of contextualized reportage, media 
outlets may be discouraged from emphasizing this type of story because some readers appear to dislike 
it.  See id.  
 85. AUBRUN & GRADY, supra note 4, at 3. 
 86. Id. at 4.  
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 3. 
 89. Id. at 5. 
 90. See, e.g., Chris Goddard & Max Liddell, Child Abuse Fatalities and the Media: Lessons from a 
Case Study, CHILD ABUSE REV., July-Aug. 1995, at 356, 359.  Goddard and Liddell describe the vicious 
abuse and death of two-year-old Daniel Valerio of Victoria, Australia as:  
[T]he type of child abuse tragedy that the media relish.  This story contained elements 
attractive to news journalists: a protective service that failed to respond but which passed 
messages to the police that never arrived; procedures that were not followed; 21 
professionals who could not recognize child abuse, even severe, apparently obvious child 
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than the monstrous parents, tend to reinforce dramatically the horror story theme.91  
For example, one story described in this report as reflecting government 
dysfunction is Abuse Cases Rise in D.C., But Fewer Go to Court, by Henri Cauvin 
of the Washington Post.  The report says:  
This article talks about a decline in the number of charges against parents in 
Washington, D.C. The implicit question is whether the decline has happened 
because the agency is doing a poor job of keeping up with cases, or because they 
are being less aggressive in removing kids from families.92   
In critiquing the “condemn[ation of] the system”93 conveyed in this article, 
Aubrun and Grady themselves appear to assume that earlier (i.e., pre-decline) rates 
of child removal were appropriate.  Aubrun and Grady do not suggest the 
possibility that the recent, lower removal numbers reflect sound, measured 
judgment by the agency.  Presumably, the story also did not consider this 
possibility—so powerful is the master narrative of child welfare, in which 
removing children from their homes is the natural protective response against 
parents seen as uncontrollably predatory. 
Additional stories proffered as depicting governmental inadequacy also 
reinforce the horror story theme of gruesome abuse of children by parents.  For 
example, the report quotes from a Houston Chronicle story about the incarceration 
of a mother heard on “a 911 audio tape [that] recorded sounds of whacks and 
screams as [her child] was hit 60 times with a board,”94 and a Dateline, NBC 
special that decried the “many [abused] children [who] can fall through the cracks 
. . . .”95  Yet another story cited for its depiction of the “failure of child protective 
services” describes Indiana’s failure to keep children from dying by their parents’ 
hand.96  The report does not cite any story about the government removing a child 
who should not have been removed. 97  Richard Wexler makes the point clearly: 
                                                                                                     
abuse; an electrician who immediately recognized abuse when highly trained and highly 
paid professionals did not; and a child who reported abuse and provided the weapon used. 
Id. 
 91. See, e.g., Richard Wexler, Caught in a Master Narrative: It’s Why So Many Stories About Child 
Welfare Get it Wrong, NIEMAN REP., Winter 2000 (“The master narrative holds that when children 
‘known to the system’ die, it must be because that system bends over backwards to keep children in, or 
return them to, dangerous homes in the name of ‘family preservation.’”).  See also Bernstein, supra note 
3 (describing her own coverage of child welfare: “Larger debates were typically framed in false 
dichotomies—say, child protection versus family preservation”). 
 92. AUBRUN & GRADY, supra note 4, at 7. 
 93. Id. at 5. 
 94. Id. at 6. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 8 (citing Richard D. Walton & Tim Evans, Deaths Rise Despite State’s Intervention: 
Agency is Plagued by Inadequate Training, Excessive Caseloads, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Dec. 8, 2002, 
available at, http://www2.indystar.com/articles/11006800-2171-092.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2010). 
 97. But see Petula Dvorak, Child Deaths Led to Excessive Foster Care Placements, Critics Say, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2009/01/07/AR2009010703582.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2010) (noting a 41 percent increase in 
children placed in foster care during the first nine months of 2008); Petula Dvorak, D.C. Social Workers 
Remove More Kids, WASH. POST, June 3, 2008, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/06/02/AR2008060202854.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2010) (noting the increase 
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In 24 years of looking at child welfare as a reporter and then as an advocate, I have 
never read a news story in which a CPS worker is criminally charged, fired, 
suspended, demoted, or even slapped on the wrist for taking away too many 
children. Yet all these things have happened to workers who leave children in their 
own homes when something goes wrong.98 
According to Aubrun and Grady, a third major frame of stories about children 
is stories about “sexual predators.”  The report finds that “[t]his kind of story is 
appalling and compelling because it involves the violation of a powerful taboo . . . 
.”99  Aubrun and Grady recognize that stories in this frame “reinforce the idea that 
there is an absolute divide between ‘normal’ parents and people on the one hand, 
and ‘monsters.’”100 
A fourth major frame of stories identified by Aubrun and Grady is described 
euphemistically as those depicting “the confusing divide between discipline and 
abuse.”101  Even these stories, however, appear to revolve around parents who 
commit terrible acts against children.  As with respect to stories categorized in 
other frames, the reports cited in this section also depict “horror stories.”  For 
example, two of three stories cited refer to parents inflicting abuse on a child.  The 
first, Second Parent Arrested in Spanking Incident, describes a parent who 
“whipped” a child, “inflicting deep bruises on the boy’s legs.”102  In the other, titled 
Witness to Child Abuse: An Episode of Indecision and Shame, a newspaper 
columnist describes observing a parent verbally abusing a “little girl” with “slurs . . 
. [that] become increasingly unprintable.  This mother is forcing the moment to its 
crisis.”103 
Another major frame of stories is described as stories about “the sanctity of the 
family;” stories that Aubrun and Grady suggest reflect recognition of parental 
authority to raise children without the involvement of the state.104  In a now 
familiar pattern, however, the first story offered as an exemplar of this category, 
titled When Parents Fail,105 has little to do with parental authority and instead 
emphasizes parental culpability for harm done to children.  The second story also 
reinforces the theme of dangerous parents, juxtaposing parents’ interests with the 
children’s safety: Price of Abuse Prevention Debated: Parents’ Privacy Pitted 
Against Child’s Well-Being.106 
The last major frame of child maltreatment news reports cited in this report 
again relates to horror stories.  Aubrun and Grady describe this category of stories 
as those depicting incidents in which “children [are] accidentally harmed by 
parents.”  Unsurprisingly, in light of the title of the frame, these stories are also 
                                                                                                     
in children who were removed from their homes by D.C.’s Child and Family Services Agency after the 
case of a D.C. mother who killed her four children).  
 98. Richard Wexler, Child Welfare Reporting: Things Sources Say that Almost Always Aren’t True, 
NIEMAN REP., Winter 2000 (emphasis added). 
 99. AUBRUN & GRADY, supra note 4, at 8. 
 100. Id. at 9. 
 101. Id. at 10. 
 102. Id. at 11-12. 
 103. Id. at 12-13. 
 104. Id. at 13. 
 105. AUBRUN & GRADY, supra note 4, at 13 
 106. Id. at 13. 
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premised fundamentally on parental culpability.  The only example offered is Texas 
Baby Dies After Being Left in Car, about a two-month-old girl who died after being 
left by her mother in a “sweltering parked car while her mother was in a Target 
store applying for a job . . . .”107  Notwithstanding the title of this frame, the story 
again underscores the theme of parental deviance, as it includes information 
suggesting that the incident was not accidental, and reports that the mother was 
charged criminally for “abandoning-endangering a child.”108   
All iterations of the master narrative, then, include a powerful element of 
blame.109  The master narrative focuses on culpability, and harshly singles out 
parents described as “deviant”110 and “monstrous.”111  Nina Bernstein describes the 
“master narrative” as a “powerful story line [which] suggests that the only real 
danger to a child is an abusive parent, and the key systemic mistake is leaving 
children in parental custody.”112 
The logic of the meta-narrative of child welfare is supported by Joel Best’s 
identification of a complimentary narrative about children, which portrays children 
as “child-victims.”113  Best argues that a drumbeat of news stories and 
modifications in the law, exacerbated by folklore and urban legends, has created a 
perception of children as victims, so that thoughts of children instantly are 
protective, even if that reaction is disproportionate to an actual threat.114  Child-
victims thus are indispensable characters in the narrative of child abuse that depicts 
parents as abusers and the abuse itself as horrific, frightening, and absurd.  A 
child’s presence in a story about abuse amplifies the emotional reaction that would 
be generated merely by the report of violence alone. 
                                                                                                     
 107. Id. at 14. 
 108. It appears that the statute under which the mother was charged is 5 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §  
22.041(b) (West 2007) (“A person commits an offense if, having custody, care, or control of a child 
younger than 15 years, he intentionally abandons the child in any place under circumstances that expose 
the child to an unreasonable risk of harm.”).  It also is possible that the mother was charged pursuant to 
5 TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.041(c) (West 2007), which includes a range of offenses, including criminally 
negligent acts or omissions: “A person commits an offense if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or 
with criminal negligence, by act or omission, engages in conduct that places a child younger than 15 
years in imminent danger of death, bodily injury, or physical or mental impairment.” 
 109. The theme of ever-present danger is reflected even in materials advocating prevention of child 
abuse and neglect.  See FRAME WORKS INSTITUTE, SUMMARY RESEARCH MEMO: FRAMEWORKS’ 
ANALYSIS OF FRAME EFFECTS ON [PREVENT CHILD ABUSE AMERICA], POLICIES AND IMPLICATIONS 
FOR MESSAGING 8 (2009).  
 110. Bernstein, supra note 3; NELSON, supra note 3, at 3. 
 111. “[M]any simple causal stories are provided that are not helpful, because they don’t tend to teach 
anything new, but rather to reinforce unproductive associations with the topic—e.g. a parent gets violent 
with his child because the parent is a sick, drunken monster.”  AUBRUN & GRADY, supra note 4, at 7.  
“[News stories about specific incidents of abuse] demonize individuals . . . .”  Id. at 3. 
 112. Bernstein, supra note 3 (expressing regret that “no matter how nuanced we tried to be in our 
front-page articles, we had reinforced a ‘master narrative’ that once again distorted public perception”).  
See also AUBRUN & GRADY, supra note 4, at 17 (“Several studies have shown that news stories about 
children tend to focus on violence and crime.”). 
 113. BEST, supra note 2, at 5. 
 114. Id. at 6-21.   Best argues that unscrutinized claims of widespread child-kidnapping gathered 
momentum from synergistic legislative hearings, media coverage, and advocacy groups’ public 
outreach.  Id. at 45-48.  Best maintains that later, the alarms were proven false by voices newly-included 
in the public conversation about the issue.  See id. at 48. 
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News coverage of child abuse and neglect is driven almost entirely by official 
sources,115 and is supportive of the official government story.116  Reporter Nina 
Bernstein acknowledges that “[p]olice and prosecutors typically became primary 
sources in these situations, which reinforces a tendency to recount the events in 
terms of individual blame and child martyrdom.”117 
As noted above, horror stories are the mainstay of child welfare reporting at 
least in part because they are the bread-and-butter of all reportage.118  Assaults on 
children are crimes, and crime stories meet many of the media’s needs.  They are 
episodic and dramatic,119 with easily-identifiable heroes and villains, and easy to 
investigate via willing, authoritative government sources.  Johnson also notes that 
crime and child-abuse-crime news “beats” often are the province of the newest 
reporters,120 who may be least likely to perceive and understand an individual 
incident in a larger context.  Nelson also suggests that stories about child-victims 
have the added benefit of allowing the media to see itself as guardian and savior of 
individual children and the community at large.121  Notwithstanding the rarity of 
these events, they receive disproportionate coverage in the media.122  Journalist 
Nina Bernstein reflected on her own efforts reporting on child welfare: “Cases we 
highlighted were by definition aberrations, like child abuse deaths . . . .”123 
2.  Framing and the Master Narrative of Child Welfare: An Example 
In this subsection, I dissect a typical horror story to illustrate “how frames 
work.”124   In general, frames highlight particular “bits of information” and make 
                                                                                                     
 115. Johnson, supra note 14, at 12 (“For stories on child abuse, newspapers and television news rely 
on official sources of information, including police, prosecutors, social welfare departments, hospitals, 
school officials, and so on.”). 
 116. Id. (“News accounts of child abuse invariably rely on official sources of information, and they 
take the official perspective toward the act being reported.”). 
 117. Bernstein, supra note 3.  See also Tiegreen & Newman, How News is “Framed”, supra note 29 
(stories in the Australian media about mental illness primarily based on information from police, 
coroner, or court records, sources which inherently focus on details of the incident at hand, and ignore 
contextual information). 
 118. See, e.g., Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr. & Shanto Iyengar, Prime Suspects: The Influence of Local 
Television News on the Viewing Public, AM. J. POL. SCI., July 2003, at 560, 562 (commenting on “the 
centrality of violent crime to news programs”). 
 119. See, e.g., BEST, supra note 2, at 79 (“Life-and-death issues, tales of heroism or villainy, are 
more likely to gain attention, sympathy, and action.”). 
 120. Johnson, supra note 14, at 13 (“Front-line reporters at the local level tend to be young and, 
unlike seasoned news veterans, unreflective about taking the official or bureaucratic view about some 
problem.”). 
 121. See NELSON, supra note 3, at 71 (“Most importantly, the press enjoys playing an advocative role 
in maintaining cultural norms that protect children and defend the integrity of the home.”). 
 122. See AUBURN & GRADY, supra note 4, at 2 (“The emphasis on sensational events and images 
pervades the news media and has obvious consequences for coverage of child maltreatment. It means 
that the shocking results of maltreatment receive a tremendous amount of attention . . . .”) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 123. Bernstein, supra note 3.  See also Ayre, supra note 13, at 889 (“Analysis by McDevitt of media 
coverage of abuse in the United States and in Ireland demonstrates a clear preference for acute and 
exceptional manifestations such as lurid child sexual abuse and child murder . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
 124. See Entman, supra note 19, at 53. 
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those more “salient,” that is—more noticeable and memorable.125  Greater salience 
increases the likelihood that “receivers” of the information, whether in print, on 
television, or by other means, will process the information and use it or store it for 
potential later use.126  Salience is increased by a variety of influences.  For 
example, information may be memorable because of its placement in a text or 
orally-reported story, or because it is repeated.127  Indirectly explaining the 
powerful and compounding influence of the master narrative of child welfare, 
Entman writes that the greatest predictor of information’s likely impact on a reader 
or viewer is the extent to which the information comports with, or departs from, the 
receiver’s preconceived notions.128  He makes this point emphatically: “[E]ven a 
single unillustrated appearance of a notion in an obscure part of the text can be 
highly salient, if it comports with the existing schemata in a receiver’s belief 
systems.”129   
Thus, our “belief systems” give both significance and meaning to information.  
We will consider it to be unimportant and unmemorable if it is not already 
recognizable.  We will give it little thought and have few words with which to 
explain it.  On the other hand, if we already have words and images that explain the 
information and which provide a ready context in which to understand it, the 
information is accepted as valuable and usable.  The very essence of the grand 
narrative of child welfare, like other meta-narratives, is that it has created a 
vocabulary and a context in which to understand stories about the subject it defines.  
To the extent that a story reflects expected frames of child abuse reporting, we will 
recognize it and store it with received memories. 
The common frames of child welfare stories are indeed exemplified in a 
September 4, 2010, New York Times story, Prosecutors Detail Abuse in Brooklyn 
Girl’s Last Days.130  As seen below, far from a “single unillustrated appearance” in 
an “obscure part of the text,” this typical horror story repeatedly uses words and 
vivid images that shock and sicken.  The bombardment of horror is almost 
unending, in fact, and takes on new and surprising forms as the story progresses. 
The headline of the story tells the reader plainly that this is a story about 
“abuse.”  The beginning of the text is consistent with Johnson’s findings about the 
typical format of horror stories: the first line of the story contains a “shocking . . . 
provocative ‘grabber’ . . . intended to grab and retain the reader’s attention.”131  
This story begins: “Two days after the bruised, emaciated body of a 4-year-old girl 
was discovered . . . .”132  The first sentence alerts the reader to the “unexpected” 
element of the story, namely that the girl’s mother is the alleged culprit, and faces 
                                                                                                     
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Al Baker, Prosecutors Detail Abuse in Brooklyn Girl’s Last Days, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2010, at 
A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/05/nyregion/05arraign.html (last visited Nov. 18, 
2010). 
 131. Johnson, supra note 14, at 11.  See also BEST, supra note 2, at 187 (“The media tend to 
emphasize those elements most likely to capture and hold their audience . . . .”). 
 132. Baker, supra note 130, at A18. 
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criminal charges in connection with the death.133 
In the next paragraph, the first line invokes the image of the government as 
powerful responder, noting that “prosecutors outlined” the “fearsome litany of 
abuse” in court documents.134  The first sentence of this paragraph also names the 
girl, personalizing the story.135  The next sentence includes a dramatic reminder of 
the “unexpected” quality of the story, again stating that the girl’s mother—named 
this time—caused her daughter to “suffer . . . in her final days.”136  The girl is 
further pathologized as having been “plagued by severe health problems since her 
birth.”137  The two-sentence paragraph ends with the striking, dramatic fact that the 
girl weighed only eighteen pounds when she died.138   
The next paragraph invokes the horror of the savage abuse that led to the 
child’s death: citing the authoritative-sounding “criminal complaint,” the story says 
that the child’s mother “repeatedly struck the girl with a belt and a video box . . . . 
The mother lashed the girl to a bed with twine and forced her ‘to take blue sleeping 
pills.’”139  The “video box,” and the actions of “lashing” the girl to a bed and 
forcing her to take sleeping pills are far outside the experiences of most people; 
their inclusion in the story underscores the mother’s criminality and deviance.  The 
words “lash” and “blue” are specific and evocative, permitting the reader to feel the 
cord and see the pills in dramatic fashion.   
The next paragraph reminds the reader that the child is dead, describing her 
“body,” which is again described as “emaciated.”140  The sentence continues with a 
recitation of the gruesome evidence of her torture: “[C]overed with bruises on her 
head, torso, and limbs, and ‘ligature marks’ were found on her feet.”141  The story 
explains the cause of these injuries, reminding readers of the deviance of the 
mother’s actions and embedding the horrific image in readers’ minds, 
hypothesizing that “apparently . . . her mother affixed [the girl’s feet] to the bed’s 
footboard with twine.”142   
The following paragraph invokes the majesty of governmental authority, citing 
the name and title of the “assistant district attorney.”143  The assistant district 
attorney is quoted, revealing the mother’s confession to the crime.144  Even the 
recitation of the confession adds to the impression of the mother’s savagery and 
otherness.  The assistant district attorney attributes to the mother a description of 
the mother’s now-deceased child as “wild.”145  A stereotypical mother would not 
use that word to describe her own child.  In addition, there is a dramatic contrast—
perhaps slightly disorienting for the reader—between a dead child and the violent 
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activity of a “wild” child.  Finally, even though the word “wild” is used in 
reference to the child’s behavior, this word is at odds with customary, stereotyped 
descriptions of children, and thus may further contribute to a reader’s impression 
that the entire episode is out of the ordinary.  
In dramatic rhetorical fashion, the girl’s “wildness” then is revealed as rather 
ordinary, again implicitly underscoring the mother’s otherness: the girl’s offense 
against the mother was simply eating from the refrigerator.  In an action many 
associate with ordinary children, the girl allegedly “made a mess.”  This sentence 
normalizes the child, though not obviating her status as victim, and underscores the 
bizarre distance between the mother’s behavior and societal norms.   
The following paragraph invokes the authority and sobriety of an expert: “[A] 
physician.”146  The physician’s credibility is enhanced by a reminder that he or she 
works “for the medical examiner’s office.”147  The story again mentions the child’s 
“state of malnutrition,” and quotes the authoritative criminal complaint, which uses 
dramatic words—“grave” and “risk of death”—to describe the effects of the 
malnutrition.148  Bizarrely, horribly, the reader is informed that it was when the 
child was most vulnerable—when her “state of malnutrition ‘put her at a grave risk 
of death’”—that her mother inflicted abuse on her.149   
The article continues, mentioning the court proceedings.  In these, a normal-
seeming mother “stood silently,” and wore “a hooded white sweat shirt, blue jeans 
and white sneakers.”150  Then, however, the mother is demonized implicitly.  The 
moment of normalcy depicted by the reporter is abruptly shattered when the story 
immediately conveys the mother’s deviant behavior: “[S]he smiled and waved” to 
family members in the courtroom.151  The reader is informed by this detail that the 
mother is remorseless—indeed, may be pleased—about the pain, terror, and death 
she inflicted on her daughter.  This detail reminds the reader that the mother is 
monstrous and deviant.   
The story then adds an element of the “incompetence of government” frame 
identified by Aubrun and Grady.  The author points out that the local child welfare 
agency “had been monitoring the family since at least November.”152  Consistent 
with Nina Bernstein’s admission, this information, like the details of the child’s 
death, is drawn from “officials.”   
The story continues, quoting the mother’s brother, who says “my sister loved 
her kids.”153  The statement is commonplace, so that it almost goes unheard.  It also 
is easily dismissed, as the reader’s impressions of the mother have long-since been 
formed: we know that this is not a woman who “loves her children,” regardless of 
the protestations of a family member.  The brother’s credibility immediately is 
undercut further by the next sentences of the story.154  These sentences reveal that, 
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despite residing in “the apartment” with the mother, the brother claims he had been 
unaware, prior to the court proceeding, that his sister had “restrained or beaten her 
child.”155  The reader’s formative impressions of this story having been created by 
the early paragraphs, in which the gory abuse was detailed and the child’s trauma 
described in graphic detail, we associate the mother with a reign of terror.  The 
images stay in the reader’s mind, and become the filter through which the story is 
understood: “emaciated,” “bruised,” “lashed.”  We cannot imagine not knowing—
and perhaps being implicated in—abuse as pervasive as that depicted.  As we read, 
it is all we see; how then could her brother have missed it?   
The mother’s brother is quoted again, defending his sister, complaining that 
“the media’s trying to make her into an animal.”156  The reader’s impressions of the 
mother are so deeply-formed by now that the brother’s comments smack of bias 
and, notwithstanding their perceptiveness, also, ironically, of naiveté.  The use of 
the word “animal” reinforces the reader’s impressions of the mother.  In light of the 
frenzy, fury, and disgust generated by the awful tale thus far, the word “animal” 
seems consistent with the inhuman behavior described earlier in the story. 
The story then refers to the mother’s lawyer and several government officials, 
before returning to “the girl’s plight.”157  The article states that the mother called 
911, a reminder of the dramatic circumstances of the incident.158   
The mother’s initial story to “investigators,” which suggests that the child was 
hurt accidentally, immediately is discounted by the assistant district attorney, the 
story’s chief authority figure.159  Reference to the mother’s story heightens the 
drama, because she claims the girl “had fallen down the stairs,”160 a frightening and 
painful-sounding experience.  The story again mentions the “bruises” on the girl’s 
body.161   
After briefly listing the criminal charges against the mother, the story mentions 
that “the girl’s father . . . who is separated from Ms. Brett-Pierce” was present in 
court.162  This reference plays on the stereotype, identified by Professor Dorothy 
Roberts and described more fully below,163 of black women maligned for 
purportedly excluding fathers from their children’s lives and depriving children of 
the perceived benefits of a two-parent household.  Thus, the story is consistent with 
another important element of the master narrative.164 
Finally, the story concludes by mentioning “blood,” a word that may evoke a 
physical sensation in readers.165  The word is noticeable for its rarity in news stories 
and serves as an unmistakable reminder of the life-and-death nature of the incident.  
According to the story, blood was found on “a broken video box” in the family’s 
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home.166  A reference to a common household item being used in a manner so far 
from its designed usage again reminds the reader of the vast gulf between this 
mother’s conduct and normalcy.167  Truly, this is evidence of deviance.  The 
reference to blood at the end of the story also makes it stick in the reader’s mind 
because of the concept of “recency,” which suggests that readers and listeners have 
the greatest recall of the things they see or hear first—the “grabber”: “bruised, 
emaciated body”—and last (“blood”).   
This story is a representative exemplar of the genre of child abuse horror 
stories identified by John M. Johnson and others.  The frames of the story are 
conspicuous and memorable.  Although the story is only 748 words, the following 
words appear: bruised, bruises (twice), emaciated (twice), life and death, fearsome, 
litany of abuse, struck, lashed, forced, ligature marks, wild, abuse, grave risk of 
death, homicide, animal, autopsy, the girl’s plight, and blood.  The story-frame is 
invoked unmistakably by repetition, as indicated by Entman, including four 
consecutive sentences that refer to the mother “tying the girl down,” “lash[ing] the 
girl to a bed,” “affixing” the girls feet to the bed’s footboard “with twine,” and 
tying the child.  Each reference in the story to a horrifying, gruesome act and a 
violent, deviant parent stands on the shoulders of the many such images and stories 
to which the “receivers” of the information contained in the story already have 
been exposed, and which together form the master narrative revealed by Johnson’s 
research and that of Aubrun and Grady and others. 
C.  Another Story of Child Welfare 
Barbara Stark cautions that meta-narratives “tell us more about the ambitions 
of their proponents than about the world they claim to explain.”168   Indeed, data 
and stories reveal more to the story of child welfare than is depicted by the master 
narrative.  In this section, I share stories and research findings that create a different 
narrative of child welfare. 
1.  Foster Care is Populated by Children from Low-Income Families Who 
Experience Neglect, Not Abuse 
Contrary to the master narrative, brutal attacks against children by their parents 
are rare, and few children in the foster care system were abused by their families.  
Nationally, most children in foster care experienced “neglect,” not physical 
abuse.169  For example, “[e]ighty percent of new referrals [to the District of 
                                                                                                     
 166. Id. 
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 169. “Neglect is the most common form of child maltreatment.  Three times as many children are 
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Columbia Family Court] in 2008 were for allegations of neglect and 18% were for 
allegations of abuse.”170   “Neglect,” a far less dramatic, if potentially deleterious 
condition, is widely-recognized as conditions such as lack of food, clothing, 
medical care, or supervision,171 that are equivalent to, or caused by, poverty. 172  For 
example, in Fiscal Year 2008, thirty-four children were taken into foster care in the 
District of Columbia primarily because they lived in “inadequate housing.”173  In 
                                                                                                     
http://www.chapinhall.org/sites/default/files/old_reports/406.pdf.  (“Data from National Child Abuse 
and Neglect Data System (NCANDS) and the National Incidence Studies both suggest that neglect is the 
primary type of maltreatment among very young children who are reported as victims of maltreatment . . 
. .”). 
 170. See SUPERIOR COURT OF THE D.C., FAMILY COURT 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 46 (2009). 
 171. D.C. CODE § 16-2301(9)(A)(ii) (2010).  The statute provides, in relevant part: 
The term “neglected child” means a child: who is without proper parental care or control, 
subsistence, education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for his or her 
physical, mental, or emotional health, and the deprivation is not due to the lack of 
financial means of his or her parent, guardian, or custodian. 
Id.  See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-103(1)(a)(III) (2010) (“[Neglect means] any case in which a child 
is a child in need of services because the child’s parents, legal guardian, or custodian fails to take the 
same actions to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical care, or supervision that a prudent 
parent would take.”);  FLA. STAT. § 39.01(44) (2010) (“‘Neglect’ occurs when a child is deprived of, or 
is allowed to be deprived of, necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment or a child is 
permitted to live in an environment when such deprivation or environment causes the child’s physical, 
mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired or to be in danger of being significantly 
impaired.”); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 261.001(4) (West 2010), which provides, in relevant part:  
“Neglect” includes: The leaving of a child in a situation where the child would be 
exposed to a substantial risk of physical or mental harm . . . placing a child in or failing to 
remove a child from a situation that a reasonable person would realize requires judgment 
or actions beyond the child’s level of maturity . . . the failure to provide a child with food, 
clothing, or shelter necessary to sustain the life or health of the child, excluding failure 
caused primarily by financial inability unless relief services had been offered and refused 
. . . . 
 172. RICHARD WEXLER, WOUNDED INNOCENTS: THE REAL VICTIMS OF THE WAR AGAINST CHILD 
ABUSE 53 (1995).  Wexler stated:  
Lawrence Aber estimates that more than half the cases agencies label neglect are really 
poverty cases.  Patrick Murphy puts the figure at 90 percent, and Martin Guggenheim of 
New York University says it’s at least 95 percent.  “It is incredibly rare to have a case of 
neglect that is not poverty-related,” says Florence Roberts of Brooklyn Legal Services. 
Id.  See also Roby Chavez, Poverty Rate on the Rise in D.C., WTTG FOX 5 (Mar. 25, 2010, 11:39 pm 
EST), http://www.myfoxdc.com/dpp/news/local/poverty-rate-on-the-rise-in-dc-032510 (last visited 
Sept. 6, 2010).  Judith Sandalow, Executive Director of The Children’s Law Center, was quoted: 
We represent three boys—5, 4 and 1 1/2 in foster care.  Everyone—the judge and social 
worker—believes they should go back to the mom and dad. Because of the recession, 
they are unemployed and have no place to live. Just because they are poor, this family is 
split up. 
Id.  
 173. CHILD & FAMILY SERVICES AGENCY, ANNUAL PUBLIC REPORT 34 (2008), available at 
http://www.cfsa.dc.gov/DC/CFSA/About+CFSA/Who+We+Are/Publications/Annual+Reports/Annual+
Report+2008.  “[I]ncidence of inadequate housing as a primary reason for children’s entrance into foster 
care rose over 50% from [FY 2007].”  Id. at 27.  See also Richard Wexler, Take the Child and Run: 
How AFSA and the Mentality Behind it Harm Children, 13 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 435 (2010).  Wexler 
writes:  
In Los Angeles, the pipes in a grandmother’s rented house burst, flooding the basement 
and making the home a health hazard. Instead of helping them find another place to live, 
child protective workers take away the granddaughter and place her in foster care. She 
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reality, few parents of children in the foster care system are “monstrous” deviants 
who batter their children; instead, virtually all parents of children in the foster care 
system struggle with poverty, and many face inadequate housing, ill health, or 
substance abuse.174 
For example, for want of $491, a young child died in a fire, and his brother and 
two half-sisters were taken and placed in foster care.175  On Monday, September 
19, 2005, Maria Vasquez had applied for emergency financial assistance.176  Ms. 
Vasquez had been in the hospital, and had not paid her electric bill.177  Power in her 
apartment was out.178  A city official told her that the electricity would be restored 
within forty-eight hours,179 but the power was not turned on.  On Thursday, that 
official gave to the chief of the city’s energy assistance division forms required for 
the chief’s review.180  On Friday morning, the chief approved the request and “left 
the paperwork in the city official’s drawer . . . for her to call [the electric 
company].”181  The official and two other employees did not come to work that 
                                                                                                     
dies there, allegedly killed by her foster mother. The child welfare agency that would 
spend nothing to move the family offers $5,000 for the funeral.  
Id. at 436 (citing Nicholas Riccardi, Grandmother Blames County in Latest Death of Foster Child, L.A. 
TIMES, Jun. 15, 1999, at B1, available at http://articles/latimes.com/1999/jun/15/local/me-46762).  
Wexler provides another example:  
Kimberlee Diedrich and her boyfriend move to Nashville, Tenn. to try to find work.  But 
the odd jobs they can find aren’t enough for them to afford permanent housing.  An 
outreach worker who specializes in helping homeless, pregnant women does her best—
but the couple encounter waiting list after waiting list.  When the outreach worker comes 
up with enough money, the couple stay in cheap hotels.  But they’re on the streets, one 
day away from being able to move into an apartment, when their son, Cherokeewolf 
William Diedrich, is born.  Rather than help with housing, the child welfare agency 
confiscates the infant at birth.  He’s placed with foster parents who want to adopt, and 
refuse to use the boy’s Indian name.  Now the couple has a place to live—but no son.  
He’s dead under mysterious circumstances.  The foster parents deny any wrongdoing.  
Id. at 436-37 (citing Kate Howard, Foster Baby’s Tragic Beginning, Tragic End, TENNESSEAN, Feb. 5, 
2010). 
 174. See Catherine R. Lawrence et al., The Impact of Foster Care on Development, DEV. & 
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, Feb. 10, 2006, at 57, 58.  The article  explained:   
Entry is often associated with a history of child maltreatment perpetrated by the primary 
caregiver, failure of primary caregivers to protect children from maltreatment by others, 
parental chemical addiction, psychological or physical illness of the primary caregiver, 
homelessness, children’s behavior problems, poor quality of the parent-child relationship, 
and parental abandonment of children.  
Id.  See also CHILD WELFARE FUND, A Matter of Judgment: Deciding the Future of Family Court in 
NYC, CHILD WELFARE WATCH, Winter 2005-2006, available at http://www.newschool.edu/ 
milano/nycaffairs/documents/cww-vol12.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2010) (“A very high percentage of 
confirmed child neglect cases in New York City involve a parent who is abusing drugs or alcohol and 
living in extreme poverty.”). 
 175. Sari Horwitz, Dire Convergence of Events Leads to Infant’s Death in Fire, WASH. POST, Sept. 
26, 2005, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/25/ 
AR2005092501587.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2010). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id.. 
 181. Horwitz, supra note 175. 
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day, and the “sign-off papers” remained in the desk drawer.182  On Saturday night, 
Ms. Vasquez’s daughter put her ten-month-old son, Jonah, to bed.183  Jonah was 
afraid of the dark.184  The electricity was still out, so Ms. Flores lit a candle and left 
it in Jonah’s room.185  A few hours later, Jonah was caught in a fire ignited by the 
candle and died before firefighters could reach him.186  Firefighters rescued 
Vasquez’s daughters, Danitza, twelve, and Eliza, four, and Flores’ son, Jaleed, 
two.187  The children were then taken into custody by case workers.188  Several 
days later, at the initial court hearing, the court approved the agency’s request to 
keep the children in foster care.189 
The Flores case should not be understood as aberrational.  Richard Wexler 
shares an example of a situation in which three California children were deemed 
“neglected” because:  
[Their] impoverished single mother [could not] find someone to watch her 
children while she work[ed] at night, tending a ride at a theme park. So she [left] 
her eight, six, and four-year-old children alone in the motel room that [was] the 
only housing they [could] afford.  Someone call[ed] child protective services. 
Instead of helping her with babysitting or daycare, [Child Protective Services] 
[took] away the children on the spot.190 
Other children are placed in foster care because they miss school without an 
adequate explanation,191 because they are left alone by their parents for excessive 
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 190. Wexler, Take the Child and Run, supra note 173, at 436 (citing Laura Saari, Checking Up on the 
Children, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Jan. 17, 1999, at E1). 
 191. See In re S.D., Jr., 549 P.2d 1190, 1198 (Alaska 1976) (during a one week period, the parents 
were under the influence of alcohol and as a result, the children were not in school.  The father testified 
that his drinking prevented him from driving, one of the children testified that his father would not help 
him get to school because of the father’s drinking, the parents refused to give one child bus fare so that 
he might get to school, and the mother’s sickness—which prevented her from seeing that her children 
got to school—seemed to have been brought on by her drinking); In re J.C., 591 S.E.2d 475, 477 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 2003) (children had a high number of unexcused absences from school, there was an extended 
period of time during which the children continued to miss school, and the parents were unwilling to 
talk with the school representative about their children’s truancy); In re Ember “R”, 727 N.Y.S.2d 767, 
768-69 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (one child was absent from school thirty-nine times and tardy thirty-
eight, and had failing grades; the other child’s attendance record—absent thirty-eight times and tardy 
thirty-eight times—also was affecting her grades); In re William A.A., 807 N.Y.S.2d 181, 183-84 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2005) (child was neglected when his mother removed him from public school and did not 
enroll him in another school, and left the child home alone while she worked, during which time he was 
supposed to complete his homework and lessons, despite his reading disability and his need for structure 
and guidance. The court also found that the mother had failed to follow the advice of the child’s 
psychologist, and had taken the child off of prescribed medicine without notifying the doctor. The 
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periods of time,192 or because of “death of a parent, parental incarceration, parental 
chemical addiction, or homelessness” without maltreatment.193 
As noted above, these stories are representative of the vast majority of child 
welfare cases.  The children whose lives are described in these vignettes were not 
brutally abused; were not the victim of savagery by their parents or another adult; 
were not raised by “psychopaths or sociopaths” or “monstrous deviants.”  These 
are complicated tales of three-dimensional lives, not horror stories with “cardboard 
cutouts”194 of caricatured villains and victims. 
2.  Many Children Suffer Greater Harm in Foster Care Than at Home 
The master narrative of child welfare—deviant parents inflicting savage abuse 
on innocent child-victims—suggests that children must be torn from their 
dangerous families, and must remain away from their families as long as possible.  
Images of psychopaths brutalizing children tell us that separation of a child from 
her under-suspicion parent can only be a good thing; the alternative, foster care, is 
expected to be better.  Were all foster children the victims of abuse such as that 
described in John M. Johnson’s horror stories, their placement in foster care indeed 
rightly would be a valence issue, not susceptible to debate.  However, because most 
children in foster care are taken from their families because of real or suspected 
neglect, and because of the traumatic effects of separation from family and friends 
and community, and because conditions in foster care often simply are 
undesirable—or worse—data and children’s real experiences reveal the existence 
of a different iteration of reality. 
Research demonstrates that many children—including those who suffer 
maltreatment at home—would fare better if left at home than if put in foster care.  
“Throughout the current foster care literature, removing children from their 
families of origin and placing them in out of home care has been associated with 
negative developmental consequences that place children at risk for behavioral, 
psychological, developmental, and academic problems . . . .”195  Children 
experience significant trauma from separation from family, friends, and 
community, as well as repeatedly moving from one foster home or group home to 
another, and from abuse experienced while in foster care. 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist Dr. Joseph Doyle reviewed 
data about more than 15,000 children involved with the Illinois child welfare 
system.196  Doyle excluded from his study children who had suffered severe 
physical or sexual abuse—the group whose tragic circumstances comprise the 
                                                                                                     
evidence also established that the mother’s home was extremely cluttered, to the point of being a fire 
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 192. In re A.L.W., 773 S.W.2d 129, 130 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (four children were left at home 
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 193. Lawrence, supra note 174, at 61. 
 194. See Katherine R. Kruse, Beyond Cardboard Clients in Legal Ethics, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
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content of the sensational, lurid tales that form the “master narrative.”197  Left with 
a pool of children who had suffered “garden variety” maltreatment, Doyle 
examined life outcomes for children placed in foster care as compared to those of 
“similarly-maltreated” children who were allowed to remain at home with their 
families.198  Doyle found that children placed in foster care fared worse than 
similarly-maltreated children who remained at home.199  Foster children were more 
likely to become pregnant during their teen years,200 more likely to be involved in 
the juvenile justice system,201 and less likely to find employment.202  In a different 
study, with a sample of 23,000 children, Doyle found that children placed in foster 
care were two to three times more likely to be arrested, imprisoned, and 
incarcerated than similarly-maltreated children who remained at home.203 
Doyle’s findings, though of unprecedented scope, are not without precedent.  
For example, a 2006 study of Minnesota children concluded that children removed 
from their families and placed in foster care developed more significant behavioral 
problems than similarly-maltreated children who remained at home with the 
maltreating caretaker.204  A 1997 study of infants born to substance-abusing 
mothers found that the language development of children placed in foster care was 
delayed in comparison to that of children who remained with their mothers.205  
Children and youth in foster care experience multiple moves from home to home206 
and high levels of abuse in foster homes and group homes.207  Former foster youth 
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 205. See Suzanne Dixon et al., Early Language Development in Children with Prenatal Exposure to 
Stimulant Drugs, 13 DEV. NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 371 (1997).  
 206. See, e.g., SACRAMENTO CNTY. GRAND JURY, THE STATE OF FOSTER CARE IN SACRAMENTO 
COUNTY § 6.0 (2010), available at http://www.sacgrandjury.org/reports/09-10/Foster-Care-Report.pdf 
[hereinafter SACRAMENTO CNTY. GRAND JURY] (last visited Nov. 21, 2010).   
 207. See NELL BERNSTEIN, ALL ALONE IN THE WORLD: CHILDREN OF THE INCARCERATED 145 
(2005) (“Children are significantly more likely to be abused and neglected in foster homes than are their 
peers in the general population.”).  See also Dana DiFilippo, Avalanche of Anguish, PHILA. DAILY 
NEWS, (Jan. 21, 2010).  The article quotes Children’s Rights, Inc. attorney, Marcia Lowry, who stated:  
I’ve been doing this work for a long time and represented thousands and thousands of 
foster children, both in class-action lawsuits and individually, and I have almost never 
seen a child, boy or girl, who has been in foster care for any length of time who has not 
been sexually abused in some way, whether it is child-on-child or not. 
Id.; Leslie Kaufman & Richard Lezin Jones, Report Finds Flaws in Inquiries on Foster Abuse in New 
Jersey, N.Y TIMES, May 23, 2003, at A1 (reporting research findings that allegations of abuse and 
neglect in state foster homes frequently are mishandled, and that “‘no assurances can be given’ that any 
child in the state-monitored foster homes or institutions is actually safe”); NAT’L COAL. FOR CHILD 
PROT. REFORM, FOSTER CARE VS. FAMILY PRESERVATION: THE TRACK RECORD ON SAFETY (2010), 
available at http://www.nccpr.org/reports/01SAFETY.pdf: 
[A]n Indiana study found three times more physical abuse and twice the rate of sexual 
abuse in foster homes than in the general population. In group homes there was more 
than ten times the rate of physical abuse and more than 28 times the rate of sexual abuse 
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have high rates of homelessness,208 unemployment, 209 poverty, arrest210 and 
incarceration,211 teen pregnancy,212 dating violence victimization,213 and low 
educational achievement.214 
Children’s own words also depict their experiences in foster care.  Children’s 
stories enliven the data, depicting out-of-home placement as troubling and 
frightening for many children, marked by residential instability and emotional 
upheaval, and rife with inadequate care and privation of material goods.  These 
anecdotes are diverse and mundane, and give a flavor of ordinary slings-and-arrows 
experienced by children in foster care: 
Antoine McPherson: “I would love a chance at higher education . . . but [case 
workers] . . . told me I wasn’t college material and that maybe I needed to try trade 
school.  Then one of the staff told me I should just sell drugs.”215 
 
Derek Reid, eighteen, has been in foster care for three years.  He “signed up for a 
college program and had to forge my social worker’s signature because she never 
answered her phone.”216 
 
“[The child] was not provided grief counseling following the death of her mother 
and grandmother last year, even though the foster parents specifically asked for 
                                                                                                     
as in the general population, in part because so many children in the homes abused each 
other.  
 208. See MARK E. COURTNEY ET AL., MIDWEST EVALUATION OF ADULT FUNCTIONING OF FORMER 
FOSTER YOUTH: OUTCOMES AT AGE 21, 15-16 (2007).  See also BERNSTEIN, supra note 207, at 147 (“In 
California, 65 percent [of youth who leave the foster care system at the age of majority] transition 
directly into homelessness.”) (emphasis added). 
 209. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 207, at 147 (“Nearly half of all eighteen-year-olds leaving the foster 
care system do so without a high school diploma; fewer than 40 percent are able to find and keep a 
job.”).  See also GLORIA HOCHMAN ET. AL., THE PEW COMM’N ON CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE, FOSTER 
CARE: VOICES FROM THE INSIDE 8 (2003), available at http://pewfostercare.org/research/voices /voices-
complete.pdf (last visited Oct. 6. 2010).  Hochman observed:  
A study conducted by the University of Wisconsin found that 37% of the youth 
emancipated from foster care in 1995 still had not completed high school, [and that] 
[f]ocus groups with 100 youth in Nevada found that 41% did not have enough money to 
cover basic living expenses, 24% had supported themselves at some time by dealing 
drugs, 50% left foster care without a high school degree.  
Id. 
 210. CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, THE CASEY YOUNG ADULT SURVEY: FINDINGS OVER THREE 
YEARS (2008), available at http://www.casey.org/resources/publications/CaseyYoungAdultSurvey 
ThreeYears.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2010). 
 211. BERNSTEIN, supra note 207, at 147 (“A University of Chicago study of more than seven 
hundred teenagers in foster care found that 61 percent of boys and 41 percent of girls had been arrested 
by the age of seventeen.”).   
 212. CASEY FAMILY PROGRAMS, supra note 210. 
 213. Melissa Jonson-Reid et al., Dating Violence Among Emancipating Foster Youth, CHILD. & 
YOUTH SERV. REV., May 2007, at 557, 567. 
 214. COURTNEY ET AL., supra note 208, at 26. 
 215. Yes Youth Can: Confronting the Challenged Aging Out: Pub. Oversight Roundtable Before 
Comm. on Human Servs., Council of D.C. (2010) [hereinafter Yes Youth Can] (testimony of Antoine 
McPherson) (on file with Author).   
 216. Id. 
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it.”217 
 
“[T]he treating psychiatrist requested a neurology evaluation [for a seventeen year 
old boy] five months ago to assess facial tics.  This evaluation has not yet been 
completed.  Another physical and mental health concern that seemed casually 
expressed by one of the team members is that the youth [experiences 
encopresis].”218 
 
 Loretta Singletary recalls her experience in foster care:  
 
It was OK at first. . . . As time went on . . . I felt that I really needed my mom . . . . 
I went and talked to my old neighbor and they gave me her phone number.  When 
I told my foster mom I found my mom, she said that she could not call me on her 
telephone.219 
After living in the foster home during her middle school and high school years, 
Ms. Singletary says:  
One day when my sister and I were coming home from school, we found my foster 
mom washing and packing our clothes.  She told us she could not keep teenagers 
and the next day my sister and I were separated.  I was placed in a . . . group home 
in D.C. . . . and my sister was put in another foster home in Maryland.  I was very 
upset that I was not with my sister and brother.  The only time I got to see them 
was when we had family visits [in the Child and Family Services Agency 
building].220 
Later, Ms. Singletary was moved to a group home, where, she recalls, 
“counselors would yell at us, make [tricks] to take away our allowance and 
weekend passes.  The counselors would also make fun of the girls living in the 
home [and] tell the residents confidential information about the other residents in 
the house.”221 
In addition to these snapshots, I share here a more complete story about the last 
few years in the life of Ricardo, my client.  Ricardo was in foster care from the age 
of nine until he was almost twenty-one.  He was shot and killed in 2006, at the age 
of twenty-two. 
In 2001, Ricardo asked staff at his group home not to house him with a 
roommate because, he admitted, he was disliked by some of the other children and 
felt uncomfortable with them.  The group home ignored his request, and installed a 
roommate.  Another resident of the group home—also now-deceased by gunshot—
came in and stabbed Ricardo in the shoulder with a screwdriver.  The agency then 
proposed to bring both boys to the CFSA offices to put them in a room together to 
“mediate the dispute.”  Ricardo was petrified to be in a room with the boy who had 
                                                                                                     
 217. CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIAL POLICY, QUALITY SERVICE REVIEW: CHILDREN AND 
FAMILIES SERVED BY THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA’S CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICES AGENCY 10 (2009) 
[hereinafter QUALITY SERVICE REVIEW]. 
 218. Id. at 12. 
 219. Yes Youth Can, supra note 215 (testimony of Loretta Singletary) (on file with Author). 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
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stabbed him.  On his behalf, I declined the invitation.222 
In addition to being stabbed, Ricardo was victimized when his new roommate 
allowed other boys into the shared room.  The other boys stole some of Ricardo’s 
clothing.  It was all he had, in two garbage bags and a battered suitcase.  He had 
been in foster care since he was nine-years-old, and had carted sneakers and 
clothing to the dozens of homes he’d lived in.  Ricardo was enraged by the theft, 
and broke some of the thief’s property and kicked a hole in a wall.  Arrested for the 
destruction of property, he was locked up overnight, for the first time ever, and 
charged as a juvenile. 
The case worker planned, he told me in the courthouse hallway, to tell the 
delinquency judge that Ricardo’s best interests would be served by going to Oak 
Hill, the District of Columbia juvenile detention center, notorious for violence and 
egregious conditions. 223  The case worker said a stay in Oak Hill would “be 
therapeutic” for Ricardo.  I begged, cajoled, and bullied the case worker, and 
burned up telephone lines for hours, until I located a foster parent with an empty 
bed and persuaded the case worker that a foster home would be more appropriate 
for Ricardo than a jail. 
Later, Ricardo became a loving, gentle, doting father.  Ricardo and Candice, 
the baby’s mother, named the baby Messiah.  Candice went off to finish her final 
semester of college, and Ricardo was Messiah’s only caretaker.  The social work 
agency refused to allow the young dad to live with his baby.  The agency had no 
teen-father placements, they said.   They assigned Ricardo to reside in programs 
and buildings that did not allow babies. 
So Ricardo absconded every night, meaning he went to his mother’s home, or 
his mother-in-law’s home, or to his grown sister, or to an aunt, or to a friend or 
anywhere he could keep his baby.  Demerit after demerit after demerit from the 
social workers, harassing him, adding stress to an already-burdened life. 
The social work agency and Assistant Attorney General later sought again and 
again to have Ricardo’s neglect case closed because, they argued, he wasn’t 
appreciative of the services they were offering. 
When Ricardo became an adult and buckled under the stress and picked up 
minor adult criminal charges, the agency and Assistant Attorney General 
strenuously resisted my pleas and Ricardo’s to install an operating telephone in his 
residence.  Ricardo was wearing an electronic ankle bracelet, and needed the 
telephone to be working to connect with the bracelet, so that he would not violate 
his conditions of release on the criminal charge.  The government again took the 
position that it would be better for Ricardo to go to jail—the D.C. Jail, for adults, 
                                                                                                     
 222. Letter from Matthew I. Fraidin to Christopher S., Vice President, Fihankra Place, and Anntinette 
W., Supervisory Social Worker, Child and Family Services Agency 2 (March 22, 2001) (“[T]he 
scheduled ‘mediation’ session with [his attacker] . . . would directly conflict with Ricardo’s best 
interests.  Thus, I have advised Ricardo not to attend the meeting scheduled for Monday”) (on file with 
Author). 
 223. See District of Columbia v. Jerry M., 738 A.2d 1206, 1208 (D.C. 1999) (class action lawsuit 
filed by committed youth confined at the District of Columbia detention facility, contending District 
officials “failed to provide appropriate care, rehabilitation, and treatment to them in violation of the 
Constitution and District of Columbia Code”) (citations omitted). 
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this time—than to reside in their care.224   So they refused to install the telephone, 
to make sure he would be locked up.  The Magistrate Judge presiding over 
Ricardo’s dependency case ordered the agency to install the telephone. 
The postscript is, of course, Ricardo’s death.  The agency finally having worn 
down the Magistrate Judge, Ricardo’s case was closed a few months before he 
turned twenty-one.  A bright, sensitive, sweet guy, he had lived in dozens of foster 
homes, group homes, with his mother and grandmother, with his sisters, and in at 
least one residential treatment center, and had few ties to anyone but his wife, 
children, and other family members.  He had attended more than a dozen high 
schools without graduating.  He had a marijuana habit that seemed relatively low-
level, but showed no signs of abating.  He was about to start working at Safeway 
supermarket, and a few days away from marrying Candice. 
Ricardo was shot at 1408 Girard Street on the day police were installing a 
crime camera around the corner.  He made the paper for that. 225  That part of his 
story was public. 
Thus, children’s stories are consistent with the denatured findings of the Doyle 
and other studies.  For many children, life in foster care is difficult and damaging.  
Like Ricardo, children in foster care tote belongings from home to home to home, 
and find little solace in any.  Education and medical care are jeopardized, and for 
some, family ties are stretched beyond the breaking point.  Although there may be 
some justification for the description of the child welfare system embodied in the 
master narrative, we see that another version of the tale also has resonance. 
III.  CONFIDENTIALITY LAWS 
A.  The Law 
In most states, child welfare court hearings and records are not available to the 
public or media.  In closed-court states, statutes or court rules limit access to 
proceedings226 and records227 to people with a direct interest in the proceedings.  
                                                                                                     
 224. The Assistant Attorney General said:  
To give him a phone now to avoid being locked up because he’s done nothing on an adult 
[criminal] case is ridiculous . . . So I’m not inclined to, you know, say oh a person who 
lies about everything and won’t do anything should also have a phone in his room to keep 
him out of what may be coming to him in his adult [criminal] case.   
Telephone message from Asst. Attorney General to Author (Feb. 5, 2004) (transcript by affidavit on file 
with Author). 
 225. Allison Klein, First 4 D.C. Cameras to be Set Up This Week, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2006, at 
B1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/08/09/ 
AR2006080901777.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2010). 
 226. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.10.070 (West 2010).  The statute provides, in relevant part:  
[T]he following hearings in child-in-need-of-aid cases are closed to the public: (1) the 
initial court hearing after the filing of a petition to commence the child-in-need-of-aid 
case;  (2) a hearing following the initial hearing in which a parent, child, or other party to 
the case is present but has not had an opportunity to obtain legal representation; (3) a 
hearing, or a part of a hearing, for which the court issues a written order finding that 
allowing the hearing, or part of the hearing, to be open to the public would reasonably be 
expected to (A) stigmatize or be emotionally damaging to a child; (B) inhibit a child’s 
testimony in that hearing;  (C) disclose matters otherwise required to be kept confidential 
by state or federal statute or regulation, court order, or court rule; or (D) interfere with a 
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People authorized to have access to court hearings and records ordinarily include 
the child and parents involved in the case, their lawyers and lawyers for the 
government, and social workers.228  Those permitted access may not divulge to 
others, outside the case, what they observe in a hearing or read in a case record. 229 
For example, in the District of Columbia, child welfare hearings have been 
closed to the public at least as far back as 1963, when the District of Columbia 
                                                                                                     
criminal investigation or proceeding or a criminal defendant’s right to a fair trial in a 
criminal proceeding; before ruling on a request under this subparagraph, the court shall 
give notice and an opportunity to be heard to the state or a municipal agency that is 
assigned to the criminal investigation or to the prosecuting attorney. 
Id.  See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.24(A) (2010) (“[T]he board of county commissioners shall 
provide a special room not used for the trial of criminal or adult cases, when available, for the hearing of 
the cases of dependent, neglected, abused, and delinquent children”);  VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-302(c) 
(2010) (“The general public shall be excluded from all juvenile court hearings and only such persons 
admitted as the judge shall deem proper.”).   
 227. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-305 (2010) (court order required for public to gain access to juvenile 
records); see also 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 405 1-8 (2010).  The statute provides, in relevant part: 
Inspection and copying of juvenile court records relating to a minor who is the subject of 
a proceeding under this Act shall be restricted to the following: (1) The minor who is the 
subject of record, his parents, guardian and counsel. (2) Law enforcement officers and 
law enforcement agencies when such information is essential to executing an arrest or 
search warrant or other compulsory process, or to conducting an ongoing investigation or 
relating to a minor who has been adjudicated delinquent and there has been a previous 
finding that the act which constitutes the previous offense was committed in furtherance 
of criminal activities by a criminal street gang.  
Id.; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 58.106 (West 2010).  The statute provides, in relevant part:  
[I]nformation contained in the juvenile justice information system is confidential 
information for the use of the department and may not be disseminated by the department 
except: (1) with the permission of the juvenile offender, to military personnel of this state 
or the United States; (2) to a person or entity to which the department may grant access to 
adult criminal history records… (3) to a juvenile justice agency; (4) to the Texas Youth 
Commission and the Texas Juvenile Probation Commission for analytical purposes; 
and (5) to the office of independent ombudsman of the Texas Youth Commission. 
Id. 
 228. For a historical perspective on the evolution of confidentiality laws, see generally Kathleen 
Bean, Changing the Rules: Public Access to Dependency Court, 79 DENV. U. L. REV. 1 (2002).  See 
also KAY FARLEY, ISSUE BRIEF: PUBLIC ACCESS TO CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT PROCEEDINGS, NAT’L 
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS 2 (2003), http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Gov/IssueBriefs/Brf-Opn-Crts-
July-03.pdf. 
 229. ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.070(f) (2010) (“[A] person attending a hearing open to the public may 
not disclose a name, picture, or other information that would readily lead to the identification of a child 
who is the subject of the child-in-need-of-aid case”); ALA. CODE § 12-15-129 (2010) (“[P]ersons as the 
juvenile court finds to have a proper interest in the case or in the work of the juvenile court may be 
admitted by the juvenile court on condition that the persons refrain from divulging any information 
which would identify the child . . . under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court or family involved”); 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-2009 (West 2010).  The statute provides, in relevant part: 
[T]he general public shall be excluded and only such persons admitted whose presence is 
requested by any person entitled to notice under the provisions of section 16-2007, Idaho 
Code, or as the judge shall find to have a direct interest in the case or the work of the 
court; provided that persons so admitted shall not disclose any information secured at the 
hearing which would identify an individual child or parent. 
Id. 
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Council first enacted what is now D.C. Code § 16-2316.230  D.C. Code § 16-
2316(e)(2) excludes the general public from child welfare proceedings with limited 
qualification.231  Apart from a child’s counsel, the only persons admitted to child 
welfare proceedings are those with a “proper interest in the case or the work of the 
court.”232  The D.C. Superior Court has laid out a list of specified persons 
presumed to have a proper interest in its local rules.233  The court has also laid out a 
list of specified parties that may gain admission only through special application to 
the court, the press among them.234  Unlike the presumed proper parties, the D.C. 
Superior Court must warn the parties successfully applying for admission of “the 
criminal penalties that attach to the unauthorized use of the confidential 
information obtained” at the proceedings.235  However, whether parties are 
presumed proper or not, they must all similarly “refrain from divulging information 
identifying the child or members of the child’s family involved in the 
proceedings.”236   
Although technically the D.C. Superior Court permits the admission of 
members of the press to particular proceedings, the proper interest standard has 
been strictly construed to allow the press’s admission only if there is “reasonable 
assurance that the primary goal of protecting the child’s anonymity can be 
achieved.”237  The D.C. Court of Appeals has therefore placed the “interest of the 
press” at its highest possible priority where it merely seeks “to report on the 
workings of the court.”238  Conversely, the press’s interests are at its lowest priority 
where it “proposes to cover a specific juvenile proceeding, especially one in which 
                                                                                                     
 230. D.C. CODE § 2316(e) (2010) generally closes “child welfare court proceedings” to the public, 
but qualifies many parties under limited circumstances.  Qualified parties are also forbidden from 
divulging information procured at child welfare proceedings to the public secondhand.  Id.  A brief 
summary of the persons that may gain access to child welfare court proceedings is as follows: persons 
necessary to the proceedings; other persons (including members of the press) that have a proper interest 
in the case or the work of the court “on condition that they refrain from divulging information 
identifying the child or members of the child’s family involved in the proceedings”; the victims and 
eyewitnesses and the immediate family members and custodians of the victims and eyewitnesses; 
immediate family members and custodians of the victims and eyewitnesses.  See D.C. CODE § 16-
2316(e)(3)-(5) (2010). 
 231. See D.C. CODE § 16-2316(e)(2) (2010). 
 232. See D.C. CODE § 16-2316(e)(3) (2010).  
 233. D.C. SUP. CT. R. 45(b) (2010) provides:  
(1) Members of the Bar of the District of Columbia; (2) Authorized personnel of the 
Family Court; (3) Authorized personnel of the Division of Social Services; and (4) 
Authorized representatives of the Child and Family Services Agency, including 
representatives of private agencies providing foster care case planning and supervision 
under contract with the Agency. 
 234. Id. at 45(c) (“(1) Any authorized representative of the news media; (2) Any attorney not a 
member of the Bar of the District of Columbia; and (3) Superior Court personnel other than those 
working in the Family Court.  Other persons may be admitted at the discretion of the judicial officer.”). 
 235. Id. at 45(d).  
 236. See D.C. CODE § 16-2316(e)(3) (2010). 
 237. See In re J.D.C., 594 A.2d 70, 72 (D.C. 1991) (holding that the juvenile defendant’s right to 
anonymity trumped the media’s interest in attending the proceedings). 
 238. Id. at 77. 
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. . . the [child’s] identity has previously been widely publicized.”239 
Child welfare records are closed to public access by D.C. Code §§ 16-2331 
and 16-2332. Those sections of the statute currently restrict access to court records 
in both juvenile delinquency cases and child welfare cases.  The statutory 
provisions specify parties authorized to view “case records” and “social records,” 
240 and prohibit authorized parties from divulging information from those records to 
unauthorized persons.241 
B.  The Law-in-Action: Silencing Youth and Suppressing Stories 
Confidentiality laws are designed to protect the confidences of children, 
silence lawyers, litigants, and even the children themselves.  As the following 
examples demonstrate, even the children themselves are prohibited from telling 
their own stories outside the courtroom.  In the first example, the Family Court 
attempted to restrain publication of the story of a twenty-year-old ward who, 
believing herself unfairly victimized by the court and social work agency, 
voluntarily shared with a reporter a detailed recitation of her perspective of events.  
After the reporter observed a court hearing, at the woman’s invitation, the court 
sought to prevent the reporter from publishing a story about the woman.  In the 
second episode related below, the local child welfare agency forbade a reporter 
from maintaining communication with a youth who had shared information about 
the child’s life in the state’s custody. 
1.  Shawntaye Debrew: The Court Clamps Down 
Shawntaye Debrew was, as of 2008, a twenty-year-old mother of two 
children.242  Ms. Debrew herself was then, and had been since 1990, a ward of the 
District of Columbia.243  The Magistrate Judge presiding over the neglect case in 
which Ms. Debrew was the “respondent” ordered the removal of one of Ms. 
Debrew’s children, and then, at the behest of Ms. Debrew’s case worker, ordered 
removal of the other.244 
Ms. Debrew had anticipated this action, and previously found a safe and stable 
home for her young daughters.245  The child was residing with a friend—over the 
                                                                                                     
 239. Id. (banning Washington Post from juvenile proceedings and rejecting the Post’s argument that 
because the juvenile in question’s identity had been divulged in connection with an earlier, unconnected 
court case, that the subsequent divulging of the youth’s identity would do no harm). 
 240. The public and press generally are prohibited from directly accessing “juvenile case records” 
and “juvenile social records.”  D.C. CODE § 16-2331(b), 16-2332(b) (2010).  These statutes authorize 
viewing of records by judges and court staff, lawyers involved in the case, the child and his parents or 
guardians, other government officials, and “other persons having a professional interest in the 
protection, welfare, treatment, and rehabilitation of the respondent or of a member of his family.”  D.C. 
CODE § 16-2331(b)(1)-(7), 16-2332(b)(A)-(E) (2010). 
 241. D.C. CODE § 16-2331(b-1), 2332(b)(2) (2010). 
 242. Arthur Delaney, In Loco Parentis, WASH. CITY PAPER, Dec. 30, 2008, 
http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/display.php?id=36642. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
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District line, in Maryland.246  The Magistrate Judge’s order directing the seizure of 
the young child could not be executed in Maryland.247  So the child welfare agency 
gave a copy of the court’s order to the Prince George’s County Sheriff’s Office in 
Maryland.248  Deputies entered Ms. Debrew’s home late at night, ransacked it, but 
of course, did not locate the baby, who was most likely asleep in his crib in the 
caretaker’s home, some miles away.249  When they returned the next day, the 
deputies spotted a smoldering marijuana cigarette and arrested Ms. Debrew for 
possession of marijuana,250 all the while interrogating her as to the whereabouts of 
the baby.251  Believing the baby to be safe, and fully aware of the authorities’ intent 
to take the baby into custody, Ms. Debrew initially refused to divulge the child’s 
whereabouts.252  The deputies took Ms. Debrew to jail.253  After a night in jail, Ms. 
Debrew provided contact information for the baby’s caretaker and promptly was 
released from jail.254  The police transmitted the information to the Maryland 
Department of Social Services, who visited the home and pronounced the baby safe 
and well cared-for, and were satisfied that there was no reason to take further 
action regarding the child.255  Maryland DSS shared their findings with the District 
of Columbia Child and Family Services Agency.256 
Unsatisfied with this turn of events, CFSA took matters into its own hands.  
Calling the caretaker at her job—ironically as dispatcher for the Prince George’s 
County Sheriff’s Department—CFSA insisted that the caretaker bring the baby to 
the Maryland-D.C. state line, and hand the baby across the line.257  At 10 p.m., with 
buckets of tears pouring down her face and the baby squalling, the caretaker 
followed orders.258  CFSA took the baby, and placed him with strangers.259 
Ms. Debrew reached out to reporter Arthur Delaney, a frequent freelance 
contributor to the Washington City Paper, the District’s alternative-weekly 
newspaper.260  Delaney met extensively with Debrew, and interviewed several of 
Debrew’s family members.261  Delaney gathered a voluminous amount of 
information from his interviews and from reviewing records relating to the criminal 
charges filed against Debrew in Maryland.262  As Delaney drafted a story about 
Debrew, he accompanied her to court for a perfunctory “status conference,” at 
which little of substance occurred; the parties merely established a date for a 
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 248. Delaney, supra note 242. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Delaney, supra note 242. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
 260. See Author Archive for Arthur Delaney, WASH. CITY PAPER, 
http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/blogs/citydesk/author/adelaney (last visited Mar. 17, 2010). 
 261. See Delaney, supra note 242. 
 262. Id. 
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subsequent hearing, and left the courtroom.263 
Before Delaney entered the courtroom, however, he had signed the court’s 
standard confidentiality agreement, which purports to prohibit a signatory from 
“divulg[ing] any information to anyone who could identify the child, members of 
his family or any other person involved in the proceedings.”264  Delaney’s legal 
counsel describes the aftermath as follows: 
[T]he Superior Court’s public information officer . . . informed [Delaney] that 
merely because he attended a single insignificant scheduling hearing, he could not, 
on pain of contempt, publish any information that might identify individuals as the 
subjects of a Family Court proceeding—even information that he had 
independently obtained, including details voluntarily provided by family members 
themselves.265 
Delaney’s counsel advised him that the First Amendment would not 
countenance execution of the court’s threat.266  On the advice of counsel, Delaney 
ignored the court’s threat and published the story.267  
2.  “Paul Getty”: “He Doesn’t Want to Talk to You” 
Jason Cherkis, a Washington City Paper reporter, met Paul Getty268 in the 
summer of 2009.269  Paul was sixteen at the time, and had been in state custody 
care for many years.270  A case worker who knew both the reporter and the youth 
introduced them, believing that Paul would appreciate the opportunity to share his 
experiences of foster homes, group homes, and residential treatment centers.271 
Cherkis first met with staff of Paul’s Baltimore group home, and disclosed 
fully his role and interest in interviewing Paul.272  Cherkis informed them that his 
goal was to write a story from a youth’s perspective about life in the system.273  As 
Cherkis says, “D.C.’s child welfare system is under some scrutiny, and I wanted to 
hear from kids what it was like for them.”274  Staff approved Cherkis’s request to 
meet Paul.275 
Cherkis then met with Paul, and had a similarly transparent conversation, 
explaining the “rules of journalism,” including the meaning of such terms as “on 
the record” and “off the record.”276  Cherkis and Getty had what Cherkis describes 
                                                                                                     
 263. Id. 
 264. Open Government: Improving Transparency in the District of Columbia: Public Roundtable 
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as a “basic ‘get-to-know-you’” interview, in which they covered basic subjects 
such as Getty’s family background, interests, and health.277  Cherkis repeatedly 
assured Paul that this meeting and any other in the future were completely 
voluntary, and that Paul had absolutely no obligation to meet with the reporter or to 
share any information whatsoever.278 
As it happened, the day took on extraordinary import for Paul.  For the first 
time in Paul’s life, as far as he could recall, Paul spoke with his father.279  
Unexpectedly, after Paul had spent years moving from home to home in the foster 
care system, his father had emerged and wanted to speak with him.280  Cherkis was 
in a separate room as Paul spoke to his father by telephone, with a case worker 
listening to the call to monitor its contents and Paul’s reaction; Paul was elated.281 
Some weeks later, Cherkis was present for Paul’s second telephone 
conversation with his father, and then joined son and father for an in-person outing 
at the Baltimore Inner Harbor and a movie.282  The visit left Paul with great hope 
for the future.  According to Cherkis, Paul “was ready to pack up his [belongings] 
and move in” with his father.283 
Paul shared with Cherkis his hopes and dreams, as well as the mundane 
activities of daily life.  Cherkis, whose respect and caring for Paul is evident, 
describes Paul as “inspiring” and “smart, articulate, savvy, and self-aware.”284  “He 
relished the role as expert.”285 
Paul’s guardian ad litem (GAL) and case worker spoke with Paul 
irregularly.286  Although Cherkis had sought and obtained approval from the staff at 
Paul’s group home, the GAL and case worker were unaware for several weeks that 
Paul had spoken with Cherkis.  According to Cherkis:  
When the GAL and case worker found out that I was talking to him they were 
quite upset and wanted to know what I was doing and why.  I called them 
immediately—there was nothing to hide.  The GAL was still mad and insisted that 
it was illegal.  She emailed the judge directly.  I also e-mailed the judge and told 
the judge what I was doing.  Then I called [CFSA’s spokesperson] directly, and 
told her what I’d done.  I told her I wanted permission to keep going.  I promised I 
wouldn’t publish anything without reading the story to [Paul] and the social 
worker to make sure they’re OK with it.287 
CFSA was not “OK with it.”288  The spokeswoman wrote to Cherkis: “Your 
interviews with [Paul Getty] are at an end.  One very good reason is that [Getty] no 
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longer wishes to participate.”289 
Cherkis later learned that this was untrue:   
I called [Paul] to apologize and to make sure I hadn’t misunderstood or put him in 
a bad situation.  [Paul] told me he didn’t know what I was talking about.  No one 
had asked him if he wanted to continue talking with me, and “if it were up to me,” 
he said, “I would keep talking.  I love it.”290 
The inaccuracy of the agency’s representations regarding Paul’s wishes cast 
doubt on the genuineness of the “second compelling reason” proffered for rejecting 
the reporter’s request to maintain contact with Paul.  The agency spokeswoman 
decried Cherkis’s “lack of clarity about [his] interest in interviewing and writing 
about foster youth.”291  The spokeswoman stated:   
This is the second instance in which CFSA has learned by an indirect method that 
you are interviewing and spending time with foster youth—yet your reason, angle, 
and purpose all remain a mystery.  I’m sure [Paul Getty] is inspiring, as you noted.  
The resilience of young people in care is often remarkable.  But precisely where 
are you going with that?  Any parent would—or should—ask that question before 
agreeing to allow a minor child to participate in a media story.  Without apology, 
I’m acting just like a parent on behalf of youth in our care. 
If there’s an interest in interviewing foster youth, we need to know all about 
the angle, approach, and intended venue in advance.  Then, we have the right to 
reject requests unlikely to present the youth in a fair and sensitive manner.  When 
we do decide to go ahead, we reserve the right to select youth to participate, to 
have time to prepare them in advance, and to sit in on every interview.  Just like a 
parent again—and non-negotiable.  I’m sure you understand.292 
IV.  THE CONSEQUENCES OF CONFIDENTIALITY LAWS 
As Robert M. Entman writes, a story-frame “determines whether most people 
notice and how they understand and remember a problem, as well as how they 
evaluate and choose to act upon it.”293  The frames through which stories of child 
welfare are transmitted have created a strong meta-narrative about the subject.  The 
controlling message of horror, deviance, and violence persists despite research and 
children’s experiences that reflect a different reality.  Confidentiality laws, which 
prevent much of the alternative version of reality from coming to light, must 
shoulder some of the responsibility for the disjunction.  In this section, I argue that 
the protection provided by those laws to the unchallenged master narrative harms 
children and distorts the administration of justice.294  
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A.  Many Children are Placed in Foster Care Unnecessarily. 
Workers often could not articulate exactly why a child had to be removed . . . . 
Judges were reluctant to rule against agency requests for removal, or to return a 
child without approval from the agency . . . . Judges often “rubber stamp” agency 
recommendations because they lack confidence in their ability to assess the 
decision-making process.295 
A child may not be removed from her parents unless she is in immediate or 
imminent danger. 296  Children are presumed to be best-protected by their parents, 
and as Joseph Doyle and others have demonstrated, and as foster children 
themselves have said, out-of-home placement often is more harmful than remaining 
at home.  In addition, constitutional liberty interests are implicated by the 
infringement of a parent’s fundamental right to the “custody, control and 
management of the child.” 297  Notwithstanding the high legal barrier to removal of 
a child, and the deeply-rooted bases for that high legal barrier, however, decisions 
to remove a child from his or her home are unscientific and often incorrect.  Data 
indicate, and stories corroborate, that many children in state care are not neglected 
or abused. 
According to Professor Donald Duquette, “[Child Protection Services] is over-
inclusive [which means that] many families that are currently in the system should 
not be—imposing an enormous cost on children and their families—and on the 
system itself.”298  Therese Roe Lund and Jennifer Renne also note:  
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Judges rule on [whether to remove a child or allow her to remain at home] every 
day, but often lack a decision-making structure, which can lead to following 
agency recommendations without a thorough inquiry. This can lead to an over-
removal problem, rubber-stamping agency recommendations without knowing 
what’s driving the safety decision . . . .”299   
Paul Chill writes:  
[T]he number of [unnecessary child removals] that actually occur is alarmingly 
large. According to statistics published by the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS), more than 100,000 children who were removed in 2001—
more than one in three—were later found not to have been maltreated at all.”300 
For example, a Sacramento, California grand jury found that “[a]pproximately 
one-third of all children removed from their homes exit the foster care system 
within the first 30 days.”301  Richard Wexler writes:  
In more than 60 percent of the cases handled by [University of the District of 
Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law legal clinic] . . . students [in Fall 2008] 
. . . the children were returned home within three months [and were not found to 
be abused or neglected].  In more than 40 percent, they were sent home within a 
week—more than enough time to do enormous emotional damage to a child.302   
                                                                                                     
attack the backlog, it’s . . . likely that CFSA’s slipshod investigations . . . overlooked the 
families who need support and the children who really do need protection.  CFSA hurt 
children by tearing them from their families; did CFSA also leave children in harm’s way 
by speeding through the investigations? 
Id. 
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Further, in the District of Columbia, nearly 30 percent of cases alleging child 
abuse or neglect are simply dropped, and the children are allowed to return 
home.303  Stories flesh out the statistics: 
Five boys are taken from school and housed with strangers in foster care, because 
their mother slapped one, Arthur, across the face.  The children who were not 
slapped are dispersed to two different foster homes.  Arthur is housed in a group 
home for young children.  Four days later, the four siblings who were not slapped 
are allowed to return home to their mother, when the social work agency 
acknowledges that the children are not in danger and were not abused or neglected.  
Arthur remains in the group home. 
 
An eight-year old boy, Julius Davis, is placed in foster care after his uncle beats 
him up in a public school hallway.  Julius’s uncle does not reside with Julius’s 
mother or father (who live apart from each other).  Julius’s mother obtains a 
domestic violence protection order against the uncle.  Nonetheless, Julius, who 
already has been in foster care for one-and-one-half months, stays there for more 
than another month until the judge dismisses the case and sends him home. 
 
Isaac Denton was taken from his school and placed in foster care when he told a 
teacher that his grandfather had hit him with a metal pole, and that his mother sent 
him back to the grandfather for additional punishment.  The state also alleged that 
Isaac was “educationally neglected,” because the agency believed Isaac had 
missed seven days of school in the first month after school started in September.  
After six weeks in foster care and six weeks in his aunt’s home, the judge found 
that Isaac was not abused or neglected, finding that the government did not show 
that marks on Isaac’s leg were injuries, or that his grandfather had inflicted the 
marks.  The judge’s findings were buttressed by several witnesses, including 
Isaac’s former principal, who testified that I.D. repeatedly lied about having been 
hit or beaten by classmates and school staff.  A police officer testified that he had 
observed Isaac after the “beating” allegedly had taken place, and that Isaac was 
completely healthy and uninjured.  The state had taken Isaac from his home 
without learning any of this.  The judge also dismissed the “educational neglect” 
claim, because case workers had not noticed that the school’s attendance records 
overstated Isaac’s absentee record, including by designating Isaac as absent on the 
day the case workers took him into custody—from the schoolhouse. 
Narrative theory and issue-framing theory open a window onto the practices 
                                                                                                     
supervised by the Author and Professor Tanya Asim Cooper of the University of the District of 
Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law.  See also id. (“If you can send a child back home again 
within three months, and certainly if you can do it within a week, it’s almost certain that you never 
needed to tear apart that family in the first place”) (citing Press Release, Richard Wexler & Matthew 
Fraidin, Number of D.C. Families Torn Apart Soars 41 Percent in Wake of Fenty’s “Foster-Care 
Panic” Advocates Say (Jan. 7, 2009), available at http://www.nccpr.org/reports/dc1709.pdf). 
 303. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS & NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAM. COURT JUDGES, 
MONITORING FAMILY COURT OUTCOMES IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA:  IMPLEMENTING TOOLS TO 
MEASURE AND IMPROVE COURT PERFORMANCE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES 15 (2004).  The 
results include the following:  No papered (28.4 percent); Dismissed: Conditions ameliorated (14 
percent); Dismissed: No other information available (9.6 percent); Child ordered returned to parents (7.8 
percent); Case closed: No other information available (7.7 percent); Government motion to dismiss (6.9 
percent); Dismissed: Government unable to prove case (6.7 percent); Dismissed pre-adjudication (.8 
percent).  Id.  
2010] STORIES TOLD AND UNTOLD 41 
that result in children unnecessarily being removed from their families and those 
incorrect decisions being ratified by judges.  The privileged status of the master 
narrative provides at least a partial explanation of case workers’ decisions to 
remove children who ought not to be, and of judges’ decisions to approve those 
inaccurate decisions. 
As discussed earlier, stories of brutalized children are “good copy.”304  They 
are the most common “frame”305 of child welfare stories, because they are 
sensational and easy to investigate.  They allow the media to perceive itself as 
“guardian of the children.”  Stories of children harmed by their parents, then, may 
find a place in the newspaper or on television, and stories of brutalized or dead 
children unprotected by uncaring or incompetent government forces will find an 
easier time yet.  Thus, as Richard Wexler points out, system actors in child welfare 
are incentivized by self-interest and the threat of media coverage to house children 
in foster care, and deterred from allowing children to remain with their parents: 
“[New York City] family court judges admit they routinely remove children even 
when they don’t think CPS has made a case because they’re terrified of the 
publicity if they send a child home and something goes wrong.”306 
In addition to avoiding publicity, judges also affirm unnecessary removals of 
children because they make decisions on the basis of a noticeable paucity of 
information.  If the case worker has not previously been involved with the family, 
the judge likely will be presented with information only regarding the incident that 
precipitated the removal.307  As Lund and Renne write:  
Children are removed (or left at home) based on very little information. The legal 
community lacks a framework for understanding the process by which a child is 
determined safe or unsafe. Often we don’t even know what questions to ask or 
what additional information is needed to make such a decision.308 
The master narrative rationalizes case workers’ burdens and rushed inaccurate 
decisions by describing a system whose purpose is adjudicating the culpability of 
incurable deviants who violate sacred norms and inviolable taboos.  The narrative 
does not require accurate information, because decisions are straightforward.  
Without further investigation, the narrative informs us that parents are deviant, 
violent, “psychopaths and sociopaths.”309 
Moreover, the unchallenged master narrative limits the imagination and 
vocabulary of system actors. 310  Confidentiality restrictions render it illegal to 
“divulge information” from a case, so stories of children unnecessarily taken from 
their families remain virtually untold in states with closed courts.  As Toni Massaro 
comments: “[T]o criminalize the telling of any story is to silence that voice.”311  
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Judges, lawyers, and social workers who rarely or never have read or heard a story 
of a child taken unnecessarily from his family are unable to give genuine 
consideration to the possibility that a specific child before them need not be taken 
from his family.  Patrick Ayre points out that “where people have little direct 
personal knowledge, the image portrayed by the media becomes for them their 
image of the issue in question.”312  As Deborah Daro writes, “it is inevitable that 
what people read in the daily paper or hear on the nightly news will influence their 
perception of the problem’s scope or characteristics.”313   
Thus, even regular practitioners can know only what they have been exposed 
to.  As the research of John M. Johnson and others demonstrates, the public stories 
of child welfare are those of parents who have committed criminal acts, such as 
killing or severely injuring a child or leaving a child alone in a decrepit home.  As a 
result, when a judge must assess a child’s situation, and a lawyer must advocate for 
a child or parent, and a case worker must investigate and reach a conclusion about a 
child’s safety and welfare, they have not been equipped with the vocabulary 
necessary to perceive a child as anything other than in danger.  It is not surprising, 
then, if system actors are “over-inclusive”314 by overreacting and “over-
remov[ing]”315 children in response to allegations or concerns of abuse and neglect.  
It is not surprising that case workers take children from their families unnecessarily 
and that judges affirm those actions. 
Experiences working within the child welfare system do not disabuse actors of 
the notions ingrained by the master narrative.  Assumptions about deviant parents 
are not rebutted or challenged.  As analysts of media content recognize the 
distorting effect of news reports that describe a discrete incident in isolation from a 
broader context, so too Teresa Lund and Jennifer Renne argue that contextualized 
information is an indispensable commodity needed for reasoning and judging:   
Good decisions about safety require extensive information about the family, more 
than just describing the maltreatment. The judge should know: the extent of 
maltreatment, circumstances contributing to the maltreatment, the child’s 
vulnerabilities and strengths, the attitudes, behavior, and condition of parents, and 
how parents care for and discipline the child.316 
Nonetheless, the narrative trains system actors to ignore context.  The master 
narrative discourages system actors from seeking information beyond a few facts 
about an incident that precipitated government attention to the family.  Like most 
news stories, child welfare stories lack contextualizing information.  The patter is 
of incident after incident, intentionally shying away from complicating context that 
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saps energy from the otherwise-dramatic story of horrific abuse.  Those involved in 
incidents called “child abuse” are without context; they are nothing more than last 
night’s incident.317  Child welfare stories focus on discrete incidents of apparently-
heinous abuse, described in Manichean terms as a confrontation with the 
frightening, inscrutable face of evil.  Information and context are foreign to those 
habituated to understanding child abuse in screaming, bite-sized snippets of drama.  
After a lifetime of articles like Prosecutors Detail Abuse318 and the similar fare 
described by John M. Johnson and Aubrun and Grady, case workers, lawyers, and 
judges have no way to know that there is any more to a story than the single 
incident that brought the family into court.  System actors must fit into an existing 
frame of reference the children, parents, and facts that come before them, and the 
frame is the horror story.  
Thus, because of the effects of high caseloads and the master narrative, case 
workers often have insufficient information at the initial court hearing to permit the 
judge to make a thoughtful, careful, reasoned decision.  Notwithstanding the lack 
of information, however, case workers’ removal decisions are reinforced by judges 
wielding “rubber stamps.”319  The message sent by this pattern is consistent with 
that of the master narrative: context is irrelevant, information is unnecessary, child 
removal is the answer.  Thus rewarded, case workers naturally replicate the same 
processes again and again, with respect to each child who newly comes to their 
attention. 
Children and families are deeply affected, then, by the impenetrable master 
narrative.  The narrative, guarded from challenge by the law’s insistence that other 
stories be silenced, propels the unnecessary removal of children.  As Professor 
Duquette writes: “Over-response not only erodes personal liberty in our country 
that values it so highly, but i[t] also causes additional harm to the children we are 
trying to protect.”320 
B.  Placements with Relatives are Discouraged 
The master narrative of child welfare, which demonizes parents, also generates 
antipathy to housing children with other members of the child’s family.  Although 
federal and state laws promote placement of children with relatives if the children 
cannot be kept safe at home,321 both courts and case workers delay and prevent 
family placements. 
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Judges prevent children from living with relatives when they reflexively 
approve agency requests to keep children in foster care.  For example, one judge 
refused to allow a mother’s proposed expert witness to testify that the child’s best 
interests indicated that she should be placed with her aunt, rather than with non-
relatives in foster care.  The expert’s testimony would not be germane, the judge 
announced, because of the judge’s policy that she will not house a child with a 
relative unless the case worker grants permission: 
When we come to . . . relatives . . . I don’t make those decisions unless the agency 
does its due diligence, right?  So once the child becomes involved in the court 
process, I have to have the child protection clearances, I have to have the criminal 
background checks, and I have to have the nod from the agency that this is an 
appropriate and safe place.322 
Like stories of unnecessarily-removed children, stories of children 
unnecessarily housed with strangers in foster care instead of with family members 
generally are silenced by the law and remain untold and prevalent. 
One such story is that of fifteen-year-old Richard.  Richard’s mother was in 
jail, serving a six-month term for a minor drug offense.  Richard was living with 
his stepfather, R.R.  With Richard looking on, Mr. R. died suddenly of a heart 
attack.  Richard’s grown sister came immediately to take care of him, but as she 
drove across town, R.R.’s family rushed to the home in an effort to seize it.  When 
they arrived, they called the child welfare agency, even though the youth told them 
his sister was on her way.  When an investigating case worker responded to the 
call, the youth told her that his sister was on her way.  When the sister arrived a few 
moments later, the case worker already had decided that Richard had no one to care 
for him, and had taken Richard into custody.  Richard remained in foster care, 
living with strangers, for six weeks, missing his mother and sister, and grieving the 
death of his stepfather.  After his mother was released from jail, Richard remained 
in foster care for two weeks while case workers determined if his mother was fit to 
regain custody, even though no allegation ever had been made that Richard’s 
condition was inadequate or even threatened by anything other than the purported 
absence of an appropriate caretaker.323 
Another example is that of Arthur, the boy whose siblings were returned to 
their mother after four days.  Arthur remained in a group home, away from his 
family, for thirty days.  He was moved to a foster home, where he lived with 
strangers for two months.  The government agreed early on that Arthur’s 
grandmother would be an appropriate caregiver for the boy.  Ordinarily, Arthur and 
his brothers saw her constantly, ate meals with her, and spent nights and weekends 
in and out of her apartment, which was across the courtyard, in the same housing 
complex, as their mother’s.  In foster care, however, Arthur was not allowed even 
to see his grandmother.  The government refused to let the boy live with her until 
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they completed their paperwork, an expedited process that is supposed to take 
seventy-two hours.  The case workers repeatedly lost paperwork Arthur’s 
grandmother submitted.  They insisted that she comply with imaginary legal 
requirements, and missed court-ordered deadline after deadline to inspect her 
home. 
After thirty days of living in a group home with other children, Arthur’s life 
was again disrupted unnecessarily.  He was moved from the group home to a foster 
home so the social work agency could report compliance with a thirty-day limit on 
group home placements imposed by a federal court consent decree.324 
In the new foster home, Arthur’s foster mother abused him, leaving bruises 
from a beating with a belt.  Arthur was moved to yet another foster home—despite 
everyone’s agreement that he should have been living with his grandmother weeks 
earlier.  Arthur’s mother’s lawyers blasted the government in a Motion, and sought 
Arthur’s immediate placement with his grandmother.  Finally, after two-and-a-half-
months, the judge sent the boy to live with his grandmother. 
C.  Lawyers, Social Workers, and Judges Ignore, Reject, and Silence Parents 
The master narrative, which includes the silence of parents and family 
members, conditions system actors to expect silence from parents and family, to 
know only silence from them, to be unable to hear their voices.  Parents’ 
knowledge, opinions, and desires are discounted and discarded by judges, lawyers, 
and case workers.  Thus, even when it is lawful, appropriate, and necessary for 
parents to speak, parents are ignored or silenced.  
A California case illustrates the culture of voicelessness created by the master 
narrative.  Sacramento County Child Protective Services took Amariana Crenshaw 
from her mother, who struggled for many years with a drug addiction.325  Amariana 
was placed in the foster home of Tracy Dossman.326  Dossman beat Amariana 
repeatedly, inflicting serious, visible injuries.327 Amariana’s mother and father both 
complained repeatedly to Sacramento County CPS and to the juvenile court judge, 
but their concerns were dismissed.328  Thirty months after being placed with 
Dossman, Amariana perished in a house fire.329  Coroners said she may have been 
dead before the fire started.330 
Sacramento County CPS sought later to determine why Amariana had been left 
by its own case workers in the foster home.  Sacramento County CPS found that 
the mother’s complaints had been discounted and ignored.  The investigation report 
acknowledges that “[n]umerous allegations appear to have been discounted based 
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upon a bias in favor of the foster parent and against the credibility of the reporting 
party.”331   
Confidentiality laws have silenced the voices of parents involved in child 
welfare.  The laws prohibit parents from conveying their motivations, struggles, 
triumphs, and rationalizations.  It can be no surprise that social workers do not 
recognize the voice of a parent when a parent essays to use it.  That Amariana’s 
mother spoke within the legally-permissible confines of a case to officials 
ostensibly operating in their professional capacities made no difference to case 
workers unable to hear or appreciate her voice. 
Lawyers, too, act as if their parent-clients have nothing to say.  For example, a 
lawyer did not meet with his client, a child’s father, before a termination of parental 
rights trial.  When charged with ineffective assistance of counsel, the lawyer 
defended his conduct by saying: “I don’t know what I would have learned [from 
conversing with his client prior to the trial date] that I could have used at trial, that I 
couldn’t learn in three minutes when he was sitting at the counsel table.”332  Other 
lawyers fail or refuse to call their clients as witnesses in termination proceedings.333 
Nor are judges immune from ignoring parents’ voices and conveying a 
message, as Professor Sankaran writes: “The opinions and wishes of the parent are 
not important or relevant to the decisions being made by the court about the 
child.”334  The case of “B.B.” provides an example.  After B.B.’s mother died, B.B. 
went to live with her grandmother, Mary J.  B.B. later ran away from Ms. J’s home.  
The social work agency took B.B. into emergency custody, and sought the court’s 
approval to keep her there indefinitely, rather than returning her to her 
grandmother’s care.  At the initial hearing on the government’s request, Ms. J’s 
court-appointed lawyer was handed the charging document as she walked into the 
courtroom.  The lawyer had never met Ms. J.  The lawyer asked the court to recess 
the hearing briefly, because she did not even know whether Ms. J. was in the 
courtroom.  The lawyer had not, of course, had an opportunity to read the petition’s 
charges, or to learn from Ms. J. information about the case or Ms. J’s wishes with 
regard to B.B.’s care.  The court denied the lawyer’s request for an opportunity to 
listen to her client, and the hearing proceeded.335 
Other voices are silenced as well, if they propose to tell stories divergent from 
the master narrative.  Listeners resist giving the speakers a platform; it is 
incongruous to allow speech by a person representing words not previously 
recognized as speakable.  Speakers in Holocaust remembrance and in racial justice 
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struggles are honored for witnessing—telling and retelling tales of oppression.336  
In child welfare, however, listeners recoil from witnesses’ stories.  The stories 
threaten the narrative that forms the foundation of the listeners’ understanding of 
the child welfare system.   
For example, in In re C.H., the mother of a child recently placed in foster care 
retained the services of an experienced social worker.   The social worker met with 
the mother and daughter, observed the mother’s home, and met with extended 
family members.  He created a proposed safety plan, recommending that the child 
be moved from stranger-foster care to the home of her aunt.  Offered by the 
mother’s lawyer at the initial hearing as an expert witness, the social worker was 
not allowed to testify.  The judge responded: “[H]e can come in here all day long 
and testify about what he observed and if something happened to that child, 
everyone would say, well why on earth would you listen to him?”337 
Similarly, in In re D.W., a judge discounted the value of a person offered as a 
witness.  “Danielle” was placed in foster care because of allegations, to which her 
mother confessed, that her mother slapped Danielle’s face.  The mother sought to 
have Danielle moved from the home of her unrelated foster parents to that of her 
godmother, a move that Danielle supported.  The social work agency reported in 
court that it knew nothing about the godmother’s fitness, and therefore opposed the 
mother’s request that Danielle be placed with her.  The mother’s lawyer proposed 
that the judge allow the caretaker herself, who was in the courthouse hallway 
waiting to be summoned, to testify under oath.  The lawyer told the judge that the 
caretaker, Danielle’s namesake, would have testified that she has been a permanent 
figure in Danielle’s life since Danielle was born; that she attends the same church 
as Danielle’s family; that she has a grandson who frequently visits her and is very 
close to Danielle; that she has an available bedroom in her apartment that Danielle 
could use; that she has two poodles of whom Danielle is very fond; and that she is 
the one of the few people whom Danielle respects and obeys.  The judge sniffed at 
the lawyer: “Tell me you’re not that naïve.  You can’t be that naïve.  If we listened 
to witnesses, we wouldn’t need foster care!  They’d all come in and tell me how 
great they are.”338 
An example of a practice inherent in the structure of one locality’s child 
welfare system illustrates the pervasive culture of enforced parental silence that is 
consistent with confidentiality laws.  Pursuant to District of Columbia statute, a 
guardian ad litem is appointed for a child within twenty-four hours of the child’s 
removal from a home.339  The child remains in the social work agency’s emergency 
custody for seventy-two hours, until the initial court hearing.340  A lawyer is 
appointed for the parent, but the lawyer is not provided the name or contact 
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information of the parent until the morning of the hearing.341  For her part, the 
parent is advised by a case worker to arrive at the courthouse one hour prior to the 
scheduled initial hearing. 
That single hour will be the only time the parent meets with her lawyer prior to 
the initial hearing.  At the hearing, the parent must fight or consent to the 
government’s request to maintain custody of her child.342  If the court approves the 
agency’s request for removal, the parent may seek visitation with the child.  
Numerous other issues will arise at the initial hearing, including the possibility that 
the government will ask the court to order that the parent or her child be directed to 
undergo a physical or mental examination, submit to drug testing, engage in 
individual or family therapy, or interact with a tutor or mentor.  The government 
ordinarily seeks that the court find that the government made “reasonable efforts” 
to prevent the child’s placement in foster care.343  These matters may be of 
enormous personal importance to the parent, and may have long-lasting 
ramifications on the course of the litigation in which she and her child are involved.  
Each issue is fact-specific.  On each issue, the client is entitled to decide her 
position and to inform her lawyer of her wishes and receive the benefit of the 
lawyer’s informed counseling. 
Nonetheless, the parent has little opportunity—only one hour, in the crowded, 
chaotic courtroom hallway—to tell her story.  The parent has just one hour to 
educate the lawyer enough to represent the parent adequately.  The parent 
possesses much of the information about herself and her child that is described by 
Teresa Roe Lund and Jennifer Renne as indispensable to a court’s decision about a 
child’s safety,344 but she has little opportunity to share that information.  The 
appointment-of-counsel process thus deprives parents of the opportunity to speak to 
their lawyers.  This structural constraint reflects the devaluing of parents’ voices 
that is consistent with the confidentiality laws that silence parents’ voices and 
brand them illegal. 
The phenomenon is even more pronounced with respect to incarcerated 
parents.  Incarcerated parents are not brought across the city to appear in court.  As 
a result, an incarcerated parent has no opportunity at all to speak to her lawyer.  
Thus, the lawyer cannot learn at all from the client about the client’s parenting 
history or wishes for the child, and ethically may not make representations at the 
hearing.  Law and practice deprive the incarcerated parent of an opportunity to 
speak, either to the lawyer or, through the lawyer, in the hearing. 
Parents and family members do not speak outside the courtroom because the 
law will not allow them to speak.  As a result, system actors cannot conceive that 
parents or relatives could be a source of information.  Parents thus are silenced, 
rejected, and ignored even when it is lawful and necessary for them to speak.  
System actors believe that parents have no voice and no story to tell, that parents’ 
voices do not matter, they have nothing to say, there is nothing to be learned from 
them.  Why would we need to hear from them?  We cannot imagine that they have 
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anything to say, because secrecy laws mean we have never heard them speak.  All 
we are told of parents by those who are allowed to speak is that parents are 
“brutal,” “deviant” “monsters.”  It makes sense that parents are inaudible. 
D.  Black Children are Over-Represented in Foster Care and Receive Worse 
Treatment in Foster Care than White Children 
Child welfare systems across the country are marked by grievous racial 
disproportionality and disparity.  The proportion of black children in foster care 
outstrips their representation in the general population to an extent not explainable 
by blacks’ higher poverty rates than whites’. 345  The experiences of black children 
in foster care are far worse than those of white children.  Black families are 
investigated more frequently than are white families346 and are “less-likely . . . to 
receive in-home family services.”347  Black children are “more likely to be placed 
in foster care”348 than white children.  Black children remain in foster care longer 
than white children,349 and receive worse and lower-quality services and supports 
in foster care. 350  Again, the invulnerable master narrative of child welfare is at 
least partly to blame. 
The salient characteristics of the master narrative, described in Part II.B, 
above, intertwine inextricably with deeply-rooted stereotypes of black mothers.  
The typification of child welfare as driven by deviant, monstrous parents unable to 
care for children parallels beliefs in “[b]lack maternal unfitness.”351  False 
assumptions about the benefits of foster care mesh seamlessly with myths that 
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black children are harmed by the influence of their black mothers.  The 
phenomenon of children taken unnecessarily from their families reaches its 
apotheosis in the black community because the “belief that poor [b]lack mothers 
have nothing beneficial to impart to their children helps to legitimate the 
disproportionate disruption of their family bonds.”352 
According to Dorothy Roberts, black women are stereotyped as “Jezebel,”353 
“Mammy,”354 “Matriarch,”355 and “Welfare Queen.”356  These stereotyped images 
are characterized by negative qualities, and all are assumed to pass on those traits 
to their children.  “Jezebel” is uncontrollably sexual, promiscuous, and irresistibly 
tempting to men.357  She teaches her children to follow in her “licentious” path.358  
“Mammy” is a caricature drawn from the very real servitude of black women 
forced to “entrust their young children to the care”359 of others so that they could 
care for the children of their white slavemasters and post-Emancipation 
employers.360  From this mythical character is derived an image of black mothers as 
neglectful of and uncaring for their children.361  According to Roberts: “A 
contemporary icon of the careless [b]lack mother is the pregnant crack addict,”362 
depicted, “despite similar rates of substance abuse by white and [b]lack women,”363 
as a “[b]lack woman who put her love for crack above her love for her children.”364  
The “Matriarch” is the strong head of a large extended family—and also a single 
mother, an identity damnable since Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s famous 
condemnation of fatherless black families.365  Moynihan and others charge that 
single-mother-headed households are widespread among blacks, and a cause of a 
host of social ills.366  Finally, the “Welfare Queen” is unemployed, lazy, and a drain 
on society.367  She produces children heedless of responsibility for supporting them 
financially, secure in the knowledge that her dependence on government largesse 
will be sated.368  She “perpetuat[es] welfare dependency by transmitting a deviant 
lifestyle to her children.”369 
Together, these stereotypes depict black mothers as dangerous, depraved, and 
immoral.  The narrative of black motherhood is one of deviance, destruction, and 
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disease.  The narrative compels removal of children from black mothers.  Indeed, 
black mothers’ role as purveyors of “incurable immorality”370 conveys a notion of 
black mothers as inherently harmful to their children.  Inevitably, children raised by 
black mothers are “a menace to society—criminals, crackheads, and welfare cheats 
waiting to happen.”371  According to the myths of black maternal unfitness, black 
mothers have nothing else to give to their children, and children know only the 
pernicious influence of their upbringing.  Reminiscent of Barbara J. Nelson’s 
characterization of child abuse as a valence issue, inarguable and without room for 
debate, stereotypes of black mothers “confirm the need for the state to intervene in 
their homes to safeguard their children and to ensure that their children do not 
follow their dangerous example.”372 
The Crenshaw case, set forth in Part IV.C. above, as an illustration of the 
culture of voicelessness created by confidentiality laws, also illustrates the 
racialized impacts of confidentiality laws.  Young Amariana was repeatedly beaten 
by her foster mother.373  Her parents observed signs of abuse and repeatedly 
notified the court and social work agency.374  Nonetheless, Amariana remained in 
the custody of the abusive foster parent until she perished in a house fire.375   
Sacramento County CPS investigated its own failure to prevent Amariana’s 
death.  The agency found that the mother’s reports of abuse by the foster parent had 
been ignored because of “the belief” among social workers involved in the situation 
that the mother’s reports “were driven not by her love for her children but by her 
anger at Dossman.”376  In the context of the master narrative, case workers’ “belief” 
that Amariana’s mother did not love her daughter is easy to appreciate.  As 
demonstrated in Part II, above, relentless messaging depicts parents of children in 
foster care as unloving and indeed, incapable of love.377  That Amariana’s mother is 
black only serves, as Professor Roberts’s work points out, to confirm that 
assumption. 
We see again, then, the far-reaching consequences of the child welfare 
narrative, which complements the narrative that describes black women.  Child 
abuse typified as “irrational and incomprehensible”378 need not name Jezebel, 
Mammy, the Matriarch, and the Welfare Queen, for, as Roberts points out, when 
we use those words, we are referring to those caricatures.  When the master 
narrative spins its tale of depravity, licentiousness, violence, and evility, the race of 
the perpetrators need not be spoken, for the specters raised are of black women.  
The relentless drumbeat that perpetuates inescapable imagery of deviance and 
violence is a signal that children must be taken at the first hint of suspicion or 
concern.  When the master narrative causes children to be removed hastily and 
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unnecessarily, the children are disproportionately black.  The alignment of the 
narratives means that the children who must be taken are those of black mothers.  
And when the master narrative causes foster care systems to be dysfunctional 
repositories of the disposable children of “throwaway”379 mothers, it is black 
children who are subjected to the greatest mistreatment. 
The imagery of child welfare, its effects heightened by intersection with myths 
of black women, is protected by confidentiality laws.  Were it not for the 
suppressing effect of confidentiality laws, stories could be told of individual 
children in the foster care system whose black mothers love them.  Stories could be 
told of children who are not brutally abused, but who lack food, clothing, shelter, or 
housing because of the strains of poverty and life’s complications.380  Stories could 
be told of children, like Isaac Denton,381 taken from a black mother and later 
determined to be neither neglected nor abused. 
A coherent master narrative masks reality, suppresses individuality, and elides 
difference.  The narrative objectifies the people and events it describes.  Characters 
and events lose qualities of themselves and take on qualities imposed by the 
imaginations of others.  In child welfare, black mothers and children are especially 
objectified. 
E.  Throwaway People 
Protagonists in the grand narrative of child welfare are “throwaway people.”382  
Parents are beastly monsters and children are “criminals, crackheads, and welfare 
cheats waiting to happen.”383  We grasp for stereotypes; assumptions fill the silence 
created by confidentiality laws.  Children are caricatured as despoiled victims and 
parents are deviant abusers.  They get the treatment they deserve. 
1.  Throwaway Agencies 
Systemic dysfunction reflects the grand narrative’s message of the desserts to 
which people affected by child welfare are entitled.  Agency weaknesses are 
reflected on an institutional level, in such areas as Medicaid billing,384 contracting 
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and procurement,385 group home monitoring,386 and disaster and emergency 
planning.387  Every state in the nation failed the federal Child and Family Services 
Review.388  Virtually every state in the country bears the grotesque markings of 
racial disproportionality and disparity.389  State child welfare systems have far more 
                                                                                                     
million. That includes $82 million blown between 2003 and 2008, and an additional $94 
million over the next two years, budget documents show. 
Id. 
 385. See Letter from Deborah K. Nichols, District of Columbia Auditor, to Tommy Wells, Chairman, 
Human Services Committee, Council of the District of Columbia (undated), available at 
http://dcauditor.org/DCA/Reports/ DCA102008.pdf.  Nichols reported that:  
The Auditor’s site visits of five of 45 congregate care providers identified 32 specific 
areas of non-compliance with standard contract provisions and service provision 
requirements . . . Further, the Auditor identified six specific areas of non-compliance that 
were common at 20% or more of the five sampled providers . . . As a result, providers 
may be using practices that do not meet the District’s required standards and do not 
foster a healthy and safe environment for youth.  
Id.  (emphasis added). 
 386. See UNIV. LEGAL SERVICES, SEGREGATED & SECLUDED: AN INVESTIGATION OF D.C. 
RESIDENTS AT THE FLORIDA INSTITUTE FOR NEUROLOGIC REHABILITATION 4 (2008), available at 
http://www.uls-dc.org/finr.pdf, reporting that: 
District residents at FINR are subjected to violations of numerous District of Columbia 
human rights policies, including the use of chemical restraint with individuals with 
developmental disabilities, seclusion for up to seven days at a time, and the informal use 
of physical restraint without a written doctor’s order. Other residents report staff cursing 
at them and treating them “like garbage.” The residents at FINR spend most of their time 
isolated from the community. The vast majority of residents ULS interviewed desperately 
wanted to return home. 
(emphasis omitted). 
 387. See Bill Myers, Child-Welfare Agency Scraps Emergency Plan, WASH. EXAMINER, Mar. 27, 
2008, reporting that: 
D.C.’s child welfare agency has had to scrap an emergency-preparedness manual because 
it left thousands of needy kids to their own devices, the agency confirmed Wednesday.  
Like most city agencies, the Child and Family Services Agency was required to come up 
with a disaster plan, which it submitted in September 2007.  But the plan was so 
inadequate that the agency had to redo it . . . . The plan, required in order to obtain federal 
funding for the $281 million agency, was supposed to address ways of reaching and 
helping thousands of children who are CFSA wards in the event of a catastrophe, such as 
a flood or terrorist attack.  But CFSA conceded in drafts of the plan it had “not finalized 
its disaster plan” and instead relied on promises that it “will” develop contact lists and 
emergency information to foster families and other CFSA wards. 
 388. Children’s Bureau, Child and Family Services Reviews Fact Sheet, ADMIN. FOR CHILD & 
FAMS., http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/cwmonitoring/recruit/cfsrfactsheet.htm.  The fact sheet 
states that:  
The CFSRs enable the Children’s Bureau to: (1) ensure conformity with Federal child 
welfare requirements; (2) determine what is actually happening to children and families 
as they are engaged in child welfare services; and (3) assist States to enhance their 
capacity to help children and families achieve positive outcomes . . . . All 50 States, the 
District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico completed their first review by 2004.  No State 
was found to be in substantial conformity in all of the seven outcome areas or seven 
systemic factors. 
Id. 
 389. See, e.g., CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF SOC. POLICY, THE RACE & CHILD WELFARE PROJECT, FACT 
SHEET 1, BASIC FACTS ON DISPROPORTIONATE REPRESENTATION OF AFRICAN-AMERICANS IN THE 
FOSTER CARE SYSTEM (2004), available at http://www.cssp.org/uploadFiles/factSheet1.pdf.  See also 
54 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:1 
commonality than distinctiveness,390 and many “treat. . . [children] in assembly line 
fashion being moved from home to home, social worker to social worker, doctor to 
doctor, and school to school.”391  Indeed, by all accounts, little has changed since 
the National Commission on Children wrote in 1991:  
If the nation had deliberately designed a system that would frustrate the 
professionals who staff it, anger the public who finance it, and abandon the 
children who depend on it, it could not have done a better job than the present 
child-welfare system.  Marginal changes will not turn this system around.392 
2.  Throwaway Children 
The master narrative transforms children and youth in foster care into 
throwaways, like their parents.  And throwaway children, like thrown-away trash, 
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have no familial or emotional ties, are perceived as unaffected by where they are 
housed or with whom they live, and are disposed-of for the convenience of others.  
Like Trey Jones, nineteen-years-old, youth unthinkingly are tossed here and there.   
Jones lived with his grandparents and older brother from the age of five 
months.393  When Jones’s grandfather died, District of Columbia case workers 
feared that Jones’s grandmother would be unable to satisfy requirements to serve as 
a licensed foster parent.394  District of Columbia law permits children to live with 
relatives and others who are not licensed as foster parents.  Nonetheless, due to a 
mistaken understanding of the law, or out of an abundance of self-protective 
caution, case workers guarded against “liability”395 by unceremoniously tossing 
Jones from the stable home in which he had lived with his grandmother since the 
age of five months.396 They told Jones he had to leave his grandmother and move 
into an “Independent Living Program” (ILP).397  
Jones says: “Moving and leaving my grandmother was one of the hardest 
things for me . . . . We both cried about it.”  Jones continues: “She was the reason 
why my older brother and I was not split up when we came into the system.  My 
brother who is now 25 is still living with her and I am in an ILP.”398  The ILP is 
unpleasant and dangerous.  “My current placement is making me frustrated.  I had a 
roommate who was disrespectful, invaded my space, and would try to start fights 
with me.”399  Jones’s treatment is redolent of the master narrative’s influence.  By 
suppressing voices that would tell diverse stories, the narrative perpetuates 
assumptions that children in foster care are without worth, cannot speak, and have 
nothing to say.  So perceived, children in foster care lose their humanity and 
instead become objects treated as if they are unaffected by the slings and arrows of 
life. 
Ironically, Jones was one of approximately twenty-five youth who testified 
before the District of Columbia Council in a 2010 hearing styled Yes Youth Can.  
The power and poignancy of his testimony and that of the other witnesses reveals 
the compelling nature of stories rarely heard in “closed-court” states like the 
District of Columbia.  Like Shawntaye Debrew and “Paul Getty,” the witnesses 
rebutted by their speech the stereotypes and myths that have filled the vacuum 
created by the silence of their suppressed words. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
A. Reframing the Debate 
Opening courts or keeping them closed is a policy question susceptible to a 
balancing test.400  Proponents of open courts argue that open courts empower 
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children, permit system reform, and promote government accountability.  Concerns 
raised by opponents of open courts include worries that some children may be 
embarrassed to testify in open court before an audience that includes people whom 
they do not know, and that revealing some children’s confidences will 
“retraumatize” the vulnerable and already-injured.  Both proponents and opponents 
find support in the evolutionary history of Anglo-American courts.401   
I identify with the “proponents.”402   Nonetheless, recognizing each child’s 
unique “constellation of family, friends, experiences, goals, dreams, needs, 
problems and other factors,”403 it seems likely that the facts and circumstances of 
some children’s lives may suggest that openness is contraindicated.  Thus, I believe 
the concerns expressed are understandable, and ought to be addressed in policy 
debates and legislative wrangling. 
This Article does not suggest that the cost/benefit analysis is illegitimate or 
unnecessary.  Instead, the Article represents an effort to reframe the debate by 
naming the “master narrative” as a likely culprit in the widely-acknowledged 
dysfunction of child welfare systems across the country, and confidentiality laws as 
a facilitator of the narrative’s ill effects.   I argue that the master narrative causes 
children to be removed unnecessarily from their families and to remain outside 
relatives’ home for far longer than necessary.  I also argue that the unchallenged 
grand narrative causes parents to be excluded from participating meaningfully in 
the child welfare system.  I further argue that the entanglement of the master 
narrative and myths about black maternal unfitness exacerbate racial 
disproportionality and disparity.  Finally, I pin on the master narrative 
responsibility for child welfare’s many ailments. 
Perhaps most pernicious is the effect of the master narrative on system 
actors—lawyers, judges, and case workers whose professional lives are intertwined 
with child welfare.  Their perspective and understandings are formed by the master 
narrative as surely as are those of others in society.  Thus, when child welfare 
professionals enter the field of child welfare, they are fully-formed cognitive 
beings, deeply affected by the relentless stories of brutality and deviance to which 
they have been subjected.  Although a shift in worldview is possible, it is unlikely, 
even, or perhaps especially, for those involved in the child welfare system on a 
daily basis.  Assumptions are deeply ingrained.  As Fran Quigley suggests, 
“disorienting moments” can jar a system actor from her assumptions404—but these 
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are rare, and require reflection and encouragement to generate learning, neither of 
which is present in the child welfare system.  Finally, system actors have perhaps 
the greatest stake in perpetuation of the master narrative: it is simple and coherent, 
and explains as the failures of others the sadness and disappointments inherent in 
being part of a disjointed, dysfunctional, unsuccessful system such as child welfare. 
As a result of all of this, system actors behave in ways that mirror the master 
narrative.  They assume that children should be removed—“where there is smoke 
there is fire”—and treat parents as if they are deviant abusers, even if the 
allegations against them are unrelated to abuse.  Most tellingly, system actors 
ignore and even silence parents, rarely seeking to learn from parents about 
themselves, their children, or their priorities.  Thus, the absence of parents’ voices 
and of stories about children unnecessarily removed from parents’ care appear to 
have habituated system actors to forget that parents can speak—that they have a 
voice at all. 
B. Untold Stories 
In short, I argue that confidentiality laws shield the damaging, incomplete 
master narrative from modification.  Any debate about the future of child welfare 
must confront the interrelationship between confidentiality laws and the stereotypic 
images that drive child welfare policy and practice.  
Toni Massaro wrote: “[T]o criminalize the telling of any story is to silence that 
voice.”405  In closing, I preliminarily explore the stories that might be told by those 
silenced voices. 
In Adoption of Linus, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts sought a court 
decree terminating the parental rights of the mother and father of siblings Linus and 
Malcolm.406  The trial court ruled that adoption was in the boys’ best interests 
because their parents were unfit to care for them.407  The trial court found that the 
parents were homeless, using drugs, unemployed, and uncooperative with the 
social work agency.408  The appellate court drily recited the trial court’s findings, 
however, and reported that the findings were “not based on any evidence offered at 
trial.”409  According to the appellate court, the trial judge misheard or misconstrued 
everything. 
The recitation tells one version of the story of the litigation that controls 
Linus’s and Malcolm’s lives.  Were the transcripts and court files available for 
review, innumerable other stories could be told.  There is a latent story of the trial 
judge, who perhaps made mistakes and perhaps did not, who perhaps was unduly 
persuaded by a piece of evidence, or who perhaps appreciated its significance 
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better than the appellate court.  A story might try to answer the question, “who is 
she”?  That story might include a perspective on previous cases over which the trial 
judge presided, and might be informed by observation of her docket in the future.   
A compelling story about “why” could be told, perhaps.  That story might focus on 
the Massachusetts State’s Attorney’s Office, which prosecuted the case.  Court 
pleadings and evidence could contribute to a story analyzing the failure of the case, 
and suggest conclusions about whether the case was a weak one, or was prosecuted 
poorly, and lessons to be learned about the operations of the State’s Attorney’s 
Office.  The “who” is important, too: the stories would have a wide range of tellers, 
too, and would sound different in the voices of mother, father, child, foster parent, 
case worker, guardian ad litem.  What do they make of these experiences?  What 
did they learn and what can they teach? 
So many stories remain untold.  Massachusetts is a closed-court state.  The 
transcript of the court hearings is sealed.  The names of the child and adults 
involved in the case are obscured by initials and pseudonyms.  The family may not 
reach out to a reporter or to the public and explain their experience of child welfare.  
A reporter, no matter how enterprising, may not locate the family and report the 
details of their lives, even if they wish to share them.  The public, then, is deprived 
of the poignancy of real people, real lives, and real facts.  This deprivation limits 
the public’s inspiration to affect change and inhibits the public’s ability to marshal 
information sufficiently persuasive to bring it about.  The master narrative stays 
strong, and the consequences endure. 
A District of Columbia-area situation similarly illustrates the trove of 
information that could be the basis of stories, were access to court proceedings and 
information readily available.  Headlines screamed that the frozen corpses of two 
adopted girls had been found.410  Jasmine and Minnet Bowman were killed and 
their bodies jammed by Renee Bowman, their adoptive mother, months earlier into 
a freezer.411  The girls were discovered only after their surviving sister escaped 
through a window, and was found, battered and bruised in her nightgown, 
wandering the street.412  The “horror story” wrote itself. 
Bowman was a licensed foster parent, and the girls, who had been taken from 
their birth parents, had gone to live with Bowman as wards of the District of 
Columbia.413  The girls were placed in Bowman’s custody by D.C.’s Child and 
Family Services Agency, and their adoptions were endorsed by CFSA and 
approved by the D.C. Family Court.414   Thus, their lives had been the subject of 
court hearings and were memorialized in transcripts and court files filled with 
reports, notes, evaluations, and legal papers.  Those transcripts and documents 
could be the raw material of a wide range of stories.   
For example, then-Washington Post columnist Marc Fisher pointed out that 
information about how and why Ms. Bowman was approved as a foster and 
adoptive parent might permit taxpayers and voters to impose fiscal and political 
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accountability: “Anytime public money is involved, it’s the public’s job to demand 
oversight and accountability, and the only way to that goal is transparency.”415 
Another story that could be told by piecing together the information available 
in the court records is of lessons learned that will improve the safety of foster and 
adopted children.  I was quoted by Fisher in the on-line version of the piece: 
The neglect case files of the Bowman children would tell you when Ms. Bowman 
entered the children’s lives, what their condition was when they went to live with her, 
whether the social worker and GAL and judge really gave Ms. Bowman any scrutiny: 
did the [case worker] or [guardian ad litem] visit the children regularly before the 
adoptions were granted? CFSA (and the Board of Child Care, the private agency that 
licensed Ms. Bowman) have files, too, showing what Ms. Bowman told them, 
whether they checked it out, how well they knew her, whether they watched her with 
the children, whether they wondered why her employment ended . . . whether they 
explored her bankruptcy filings . . . There is a WORLD of information in the court 
files and in CFSA’s files, and a puzzle in there that, if put together thoughtfully, could 
save children’s lives. What happened? How? Why? Were there shortcuts? What 
assumptions were made? What pressures were the social worker and GAL (who 
probably was carrying 75 to 100 cases at the time) under?416 
The District of Columbia Superior Court allowed one newspaper reporter to 
view the court record.  The reporter had yet another perspective.  Unlike Fisher and 
I, the reporter characterized the girls’ “story [as] . . . rooted in the story of a birth 
mother consumed by substance abuse.”417 
In a later case, connected to Bowman’s only by the silence common to both, a 
ward of Maryland was found in the District of Columbia.418  The few sketchy 
details that emerged came to light because the foster father was charged with 
criminal offenses, and those proceedings were open.  A twelve-year-old girl, the 
child had been placed in foster care with a man who forced her into prostitution.419  
After two years of sex-slavery, the foster parent was arrested and charged 
criminally.420  What story would this girl tell about the Maryland Department of 
Social Services, which placed her with this foster parent?  What story could be told 
about the Maryland court that oversaw her placement?  Do we allow her story to 
remain untold because we assume she is a young black girl, one of Dorothy 
Roberts’s “Jezebels”? 
Questions ring out about Ricardo and Shawntaye and Paul Getty, about Arthur 
and his four brothers and about Isaac Denton, about Linus and Malcom, the 
Bowman girls and an unnamed Maryland girl, and about the other children who 
were mentioned or who briefly spoke in this Article.  Confidentiality laws silence 
the answers contained in their stories. 
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